Why Bush Hasn't Made Texas Kids Smarter

Philip Glass's Decline
JOHN ROCKWELL

Robert Kaplan's Cop-out
ROBERT KAGAN

THE NEW REPUBLIC

PRIL 10, 2000



Not His Way

New York Doesn't Have To Be Brutal To Be Safe

By JEFFREY ROSEN

TRB:
Yossi Klein Halevi

3.50US $3.50CAN
15>
0 78744 6 8

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Patty O'Donnell,
Vernon, Vermont

- Mother of four
- Small business owner
- Supports nuclear energy

Like the majority of Americans, Patty O'Donnell supports nuclear energy. For Patty, it all comes down to the environment. "Nuclear energy is one of the cleanest, safest sources of electricity. It keeps the lights on and the air clean."

Two-thirds of Americans believe nuclear energy should play an important role in meeting the nation's future energy needs. They know we need a reliable source of electricity to fuel our growing digital economy, and they know nuclear energy is a safe, reliable source that also helps keep our air clean. Just ask Patty O'Donnell.

AMERICANS AND NUCLEAR ENERGY.

- 73% of Americans want to keep open the option of building more nuclear plants.
- Nearly 90% believe the licenses of safe nuclear plants should be extended for an additional 20 years.

2 of 3 Americans support nuclear energy. Patty O'Donnell tells why she's among them.

NUCLEAR. THE CLEAN AIR ENERGY

NEI
NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE
For more information visit www.nei.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Politics and the Arts

WASHINGTON, D.C.
APRIL 10, 2000
ISSUE 4,447

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF AND CHAIRMAN
MARTIN PERETZ

EDITOR
PETER BEINART
Literary Editor
LEON WIESELTIER
Executive Editor
NURITH C. AIZENMAN
Senior Editors
JONATHAN COHN, MICHELLE COTTLE, GREGG EASTERBROOK, DAVID GRANN, JOHN B. JUDIS, ANDREW SULLIVAN, JAMES WOOD
Legal Affairs
JEFFREY ROSEN
Managing Editor
JASON ZENGERLE
Assistant Managing Editor
RUTH FRANKLIN
Films: STANLEY KAUFFMANN
Theater: ROBERT BRUSTEIN
Poetry: CHARLES WRIGHT
Art: JED PERL
Architecture: MARTIN FILLER
Dance: MINDY ALOFF

Contributing Writers
MATTHEW MILLER, LEE SIEGEL
New Republic Online
MARTIN EDLUND, JEREMY MCCARTER
New Republic Books (BASIC BOOKS)
TIM BARTLETT
Contributing Editors
FOUAD AJAMI, AKHIL REED AMAR, ELIOT A. COHEN, JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, NATHAN GLAZER, ANTHONY GRAFTON, ANN HULBERT, TONY JUDT, MICKEY KAUS, MICHAEL KINSLEY, CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER, GLENN C. LOURY, SHERWIN B. NULAND, DAVID RIEFF, MICHAEL J. SANDEL, MAGGIE SCARF, RONALD STEEL, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARGARET TALBOT, E.V. THAW, MICHAEL WALZER, SEAN WILENTZ, ALAN WOLFE, ROBERT WRIGHT
Contributing Artists
JACK COUGHLIN, VINT LAWRENCE, DAVID SCHORR
Special Correspondent
ANNA HUSARSKA
Associate Editors
JONATHAN CHAIT, FRANKLIN FOER
Consulting Art Director
JONATHAN HOUSTON
Editorial-Corporate Coordinator
LAURA E. OBOLENSKY
Production Director
BRUCE STEINKE
Production Manager
HENRY RIGGS
Assistant Editors
KATIE ISENBERG, RYAN LIZZA, BENJAMIN SOSKIS
Assistant to the Editor
SARAH WILDMAN
Assistant Literary Editor
BRIAN PHILLIPS
Assistant Poetry Editor
MELANIE REHAK
Reporter-Researchers
NEGAR AKHAVI, JAKE HALPERN, TIMOTHY WALIGORE

PUBLISHER
WILL LIPPINCOTT
Director of Finance and Operations
CHRISTINA R. BONIFER
Circulation and Marketing Director
SHANE G. BOEL
Director of Advertising, West
JOAN STAPLETON TOOLEY
Director of Advertising, Washington
NICHOLAS COSTON
Director of Advertising, New York
ELLEN JARVIS
Book Publishing Director
MELISSA LORD
Marketing Manager
SHABNAM K. SHARMA
Circulation Manager
HOPE ROBERTS
Accounting Manager
KIMBERLY HUSTAD
Advertising Associate
SHANNEL MYERS
Advertising Coordinator
ANN ROSSAKI
Accounting Assistant
BONNIE SCHWARTZ-WOLTMAN
Circulation Assistant
KELLY SPRING
Publisher's/Promotion Assistant
BRIAN GROH
Back Issues and Reception
STEVEN DAVIS

4 **CORRESPONDENCE** Is Bush's mind a sponge, a funnel, a strainer, or a sieve? &c.

6 **YOSSI KLEIN HALEVI** TRB: ZIONISM'S GIFT Israel solves its Christian problem.

9 **THE EDITORS** GOING DOWN GENEVA Giving up on Assad. Finally.

10 **NOTEBOOK** Marvin Olasky's woman problem, &c.

12 **DOUGLAS McGRATH** DEAR VILLAGE: DOING JACK George W. gets a priest.

14 **JAKE HALPERN** ON THE HILL: INTENTIONAL FOUL Building bombs at Amazon.com.

16 **JONATHAN WEISMAN** ONLY A TEST Has Bush really improved the Texas schools?

18 **ELIZABETH NEUFFER** KIGALI DISPATCH: IT TAKES A VILLAGE Justice, Rwanda style.

20 **MARTIN PERETZ** TEL AVIV POSTCARD: DUSK A Christian comes, and Christians go.

21 **MICHELLE COTTLE** CAMPAIGN JOURNAL: BUSHED Pundits wonder whether voters can stand seven more months of the campaign. The better question is, can George W.?

24 **JEFFREY ROSEN** EXCESSIVE FORCE Listen to Rudy Giuliani, and you'd think the Dorismond and Diallo shootings were the inevitable by-product of "broken windows" policing, which has reduced crime nationwide. In fact, they're the by-product of a mayor who ditched broken windows for something far worse.

28 **STANLEY KAUFFMANN** ON FILMS: OTHER WORLDS *Waking the Dead* is pointless; the point of *Soft Fruit* has been made too many times already.

29 **JOHN ROCKWELL** BROKEN GLASS The ups and downs of repetition in the career of Philip Glass.

32 **ROBERT KAGAN** INSIDE THE LIMO *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War* by Robert D. Kaplan

41 **OMER BARTOV** INSIDE, OUTSIDE *Nazi Policy, Jewish Workers, German Killers* by Christopher R. Browning

44 **DICK ALLEN** POEM *Then*

46 **MICHAEL CROWLEY** BOSTON DIARIST: GOING NEGATIVE

On the Cover: Photo by GINO DOMENICO/AP
On the Web: www.tnr.com

THE NEW REPUBLIC, Vol. 222, Number 15, Issue 4,447, April 10, 2000. (Printed in the United States on March 29, 2000.) Published weekly (except for combined issues dated January 3, April 17 & 24, July 10 & 17, and August 28 & September 4, 2000) at 1220 19th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036. Telephone (202) 331-7494. For advertising inquiries, please contact Ann Rossaki at (202) 331-7494 or Shannel Myers in our NY sales office at (212) 924-8700. Yearly subscriptions, $59.94; foreign, $99.94 (U.S. funds); Canada, $79.94 (U.S. funds). Back issues, $4.00 (includes postage & handling). © 2000 by The New Republic, Inc. (ISSN 0028-6583). Periodicals postage paid at Washington, D.C., and additional mailing offices. Rights and permissions: fax (202) 331-0275. Indexed in Readers' Guide, Media Review Digest. Microform, Canadian Periodical Index, CD-ROM, issue, and article copies are available through University Microfilms Intnl., 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106. Telephone 1-800-521-0600. Postmaster: Send changes of address to The New Republic, P.O. Box 37298, Boone, IA 50037-0298. Member, Audit Bureau of Circulations. Unsolicited manuscripts can be returned only if accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope (e-mail address: tnr@aol.com). For subscription inquiries or problems call 1-800-827-1289 or visit our website at www.tnr.com.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Endorse check

TO THE EDITORS:
THE NEW REPUBLIC proudly asserts that it has never before supported a Republican primary candidate and then proceeds to gush about Arizona Senator John McCain for several paragraphs ("John McCain," March 6). You still haven't supported a Republican primary candidate; your record is safe.

LEE DISE
Via the Internet

TO THE EDITORS:
In "The Case for Bradley," Robert B. Reich makes the ridiculous assertion that a liberal Democrat like Bill Bradley will ignite "nonvoters' passions and interests ... with a large vision of what we can do together as a nation." This is a favorite fantasy among liberals—that the Democratic Party can not only become ideologically pure by moving to the left but also pick up votes from nonvoters who are supposedly disenchanted with the political process. What Reich fails to realize is that nonvoters are moderate independents fed up with two political parties beholden to warring special interest groups. The sooner liberals like Reich understand that the first order of the Democratic Party must be to restore faith in government by proving that Democrats can govern responsibly, the better.

MICHAEL J. BERQUIST
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

TO THE EDITORS:
I was surprised when Fred Barnes attempted to apologize for Texas Governor George W. Bush's "mediocre" SAT scores and poor grades at Yale University by touting the governor's reputation for having "a mind like a sponge" ("The Case for Bush," March 6). In an era when even the most common citizen is bombarded with facts and opinions on a daily basis, it seems that a potential president's ability to analyze and question information, rather than to simply absorb what is spoon-fed to him by his political advisers, is the more relevant measure of intelligence.

Indeed, the notion that sorting rather than absorbing information is the true sign of the perceptive student is not a new one. The authors of *Pirke Avot* (*Sayings of the Fathers*), the 2,000-year-old book of Jewish wisdom, wrote: "There are four qualities among those that sit before the wise. They are like a sponge, a funnel, a strainer, or a sieve: a sponge, which sucks up everything; a funnel, which lets in at one end and out at the other; a strainer, which lets the wine pass out and retains the lees; and a sieve, which lets out the bran but retains the fine flour."



Rather than blame the media for unfairly branding Bush a lightweight, perhaps Barnes would better understand the broad-based support for John McCain by considering the extent to which the voting public wants to elect a leader who will not simply "attract top-notch advisers" (another accolade Barnes gives Bush) but do something that many of our recent leaders, regardless of their SAT scores, seem unwilling to attempt: think for himself.

GARY KATZ
Great Neck, New York

TO THE EDITORS:
Fred Barnes's defense of George W. Bush is part and parcel of the airbrushing of Bush's credentials that is being played out by conservative pundits. But, right at the outset of his piece, Barnes unwittingly emphasizes the weakness of his candidate. Seeking to deflect criticisms of Bush's stupidity, he cites no facts showing that the governor's intellect has improved since his "gentleman's C" days at Yale. Instead, he rails at the supposed lack of bookishness John McCain displayed during his studies at the United States Naval Academy. That hardly spells out a ringing denial of Bush's stupidity—or an affirmation of his lack thereof.

GEORGE NAGER
Washington, D.C.

TO THE EDITORS:
I found your endorsement issue quite fascinating and in-depth—and the wit of Robert B. Reich is rare—except for one quite glaring omission: any discussion of the environmental views of the candidates. I think you mentioned how Vice President Al Gore "pandered to farmers on ethanol." Now *that's* deep coverage of the issues!

We should all rightly laugh at Ralph Nader's noncampaign (but see where it goes and whether the media bothers to help it along). Nonetheless, suburban sprawl, clean air, apparent global warming, SUV idiocy, a capitalist-cluttered world: These are all long-term issues conscientious voters worry about. Is your endorsement of Gore, without mentioning his flawed but occasionally heartening environmental record, a bizarre example of subterfuge on your part? By hammering away at the virtues of technology and "the economy, stupid" at the apparent expense of greener things, are you trying not to spook your Clintonite "New Democrat" (that is, progressively antiquated) readers? I hope that TNR will become more aware of such issues in the future and debate the flaws and virtues of sound environmental policies in its customary challenging and enlightening manner.

THOMAS HERRON
Madison, Wisconsin

TO THE EDITORS:
TNR's March 6 editorial endorsing Al Gore for president was on target, except for the curious comment about the vice president's "pandering to the teachers' unions on school vouchers" ("Al Gore," March 6). On that subject Gore is quite in line with President Clinton, congressional Democrats, and a strong majority of voters, who have rejected vouchers or their analogues in 22 statewide referenda from coast to coast between 1967 and 1998. School vouchers tend to be supported initially by candidates pandering to the religious right and sectarian special interests, a strategy that goes back to Richard Nixon.

EDD DOERR
Silver Spring, Maryland

Care less

TO THE EDITORS:
Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn and I clearly disagree about the need for universal child care in the United States, but readers of TNR are at least entitled to know what I actually say in my book *Children's Interests/Mothers' Rights: The Shaping of America's Child Care Policy*. In her review ("Mothers and Markets," March 6), Lasch-Quinn not only distorts my argument but omits essential parts of it in order to support her own condemnation of child care. Let me cite just a few examples.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lasch-Quinn claims that I ignore parents' concern about the quality of child care and would willingly accept services that are merely "adequate." In the book's prologue, however, I note that, after leaving their children, "mothers ... have walked out feeling guilty, sad, anxious, fearful, with their hearts in their mouths, [and, yes, sometimes] without a care in the world." Throughout the rest of the book, I discuss, from a historical perspective (as is appropriate in a work of history), debates about quality on the part of reformers and early-childhood educators as well as parents. Lasch-Quinn asserts that I do not take seriously reformers' distinctions between care that was developmentally sound and that which was merely "custodial," when in fact I devote dozens of pages to that issue and argue that it was precisely early-twentieth-century reformers' failure to insist on developmental programs that led to the eclipse of child care as the "policy of choice" during the formative years of the American welfare state.

Lasch-Quinn implies that the reasons I and others advocate universal child care are frivolous—that we are simply looking for a way to excuse mothers from their child-rearing responsibilities. To support this assertion, she draws on my discussion of the famous Progressive-era reformer Jane Addams, misrepresenting Addams's position by suggesting that she worried that child care would "encourage mothers to work even when unnecessary." Addams knew full well, from her Hull House neighbors, that mothers sought work outside the home only under conditions of severe economic distress, primarily when they could not depend upon male breadwinners for support and wanted to spare their children the duress of labor. Lasch-Quinn fails to mention that I use Addams as an example of someone who shifted from supporting child care to calling for mothers' pensions (the state-level precedents of Aid to Families with Dependent Children) as a way to give poor and low-income women an alternative source of support and allow them to remain at home, caring for their children.

Since Lasch-Quinn is herself a social historian and a historian of African Americans, it is surprising that she gives so little weight to the ways in which race and class, not lack of responsibility, determine women's decisions to seek employment, but perhaps this explains why she cannot understand my deep concern about America's failure to provide high-quality universal child care. Under the conditions created by welfare reform, the need has become, if anything, more pressing. But, despite the influx of federal funds, good services continue to be scarce, as a newly released study by Bruce Fuller and Sharon Lynn Kagan, *Remember the Children: Mothers Balance Work and Child Care under Welfare Reform*, dramatically documents.

Instead of looking to the state for child care, Lasch-Quinn urges women to demand that men take responsibility for sharing the burden, and she cites the rising proportion of married fathers (23 percent in 1993) who are doing just that. "Married" is the operative word here; with half of American marriages ending in divorce or separation, that percentage translates into something like twelve percent of *all* fathers, since men who do not live with their children are less likely to care for them on a regular basis. Moreover, as sociologist Demie Kurz has demonstrated, the prevalence of domestic violence in all social classes means that many divorced, separated, or never-married women are extremely reluctant to resume or maintain contact with men who victimize them and their children, something that calling upon fathers for child care entails.

Finally, Lasch-Quinn is simply being reductionist when she claims that what my argument about the relationship between child care and women's social citizenship comes down to is money. Is it really necessary to point out again in 2000 that all women are not by nature destined only for motherhood but, like men, come equipped with a variety of gifts and talents that they should be allowed to develop? To be sure, women have historically accepted responsibility for caregiving (and not only for children but for elders, the chronically ill, and other family and community members needing their attention), but this does not mean these duties were always freely chosen nor that, given alternatives, some might have chosen otherwise. By the same token, many women who actually want to care for family members have been prevented from doing so—by slavery, by poverty, or, currently, by mandatory state and federal welfare-to-work policies. Only when policymakers recognize caregiving as socially valuable work and compensate it accordingly, whether it is performed by kith and kin or by professional caregivers, and when they grant all those who are

continued on page 45


THE LAW OF PEOPLES
JOHN RAWLS
"[These essays are] some of [Rawls's] strongest published expressions of feeling... These are the final products of a remarkably pure and concentrated career... The writings of John Rawls, whom it is now safe to describe as the most important political philosopher of the twentieth century... owe their influence to the fact that their depth and their insight repay the close attention that their uncompromising theoretical weight and erudition demand."
—Thomas Nagel, NEW REPUBLIC
"In contrast to the chastened, inward gaze of most 20th-century thought, Rawls's book is one of those rare works of philosophy that directs its energies outward. It has the potential to send shockingly optimistic reverberations through the world at large, and maybe even jolt those somber-suited realists right out of the realpolitik." —Will Blythe, CIVILIZATION
new in cloth
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
800 448 2242 • www.hup.harvard.edu

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TRB

FROM WASHINGTON

Zionism's Gift

IN A LITTLE-NOTED but telling phrase from his speech at Jerusalem's Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial, Pope John Paul II envisioned a future "in which there will be no more anti-Jewish feeling among Christians or anti-Christian feeling among Jews." Though the implied symmetry between the two hatreds is historically absurd, the pope's basic point was right: Jews generally, and the Jewish state especially, have a Christian problem. Israeli schools teach children to substitute an inverted capital T for the plus sign, to avoid evoking a cross. An Israeli hotel that displays a Christmas tree risks losing its kosher certification. Fear of Christianity remains one of the few emotions secular and religious Israelis still share.

And so watching the Israeli media's coverage of the pope's visit felt almost illicit. Never before had Israelis been exposed so intensively and so positively to Christianity. The government TV channel's logo for the visit featured a cross. News segments described the Sermon on the Mount, newscasters quoted from the New Testament, and the Hebrew press discovered that monks and nuns actually live among us. Suddenly Christianity became part of the Israeli landscape. The Vatican recognized Israel in 1993, but only last week did the Israeli public reciprocate. Like the rapprochement with Germany in the 1950s and the peace process with the Arab world in the 1990s, the normalization of relations with Christianity is easing the traumas of exile and making Israel a healthier society.

Israeli commentators didn't anticipate a warm welcome for the pope. Many Israelis assumed that the church still preached deicide; most had never heard of Vatican II. Yet, when the pope slowly descended at Ben-Gurion Airport and stood before the Israeli flag as the national anthem played, Israelis began to soften. TV documentaries about the pope's Jewish friendships turned his hometown, Wadowice, into an extension of Israelis' geography. Legends spread about how the pope had carried a teenage Jewish girl out of a ghetto during the Holocaust. (Apparently, he found her lying on the ground just after liberation, fed her, and then carried her on his back.) Several columnists even expressed "pope envy"—noting the difference between John Paul, with his devotion to reconciliation, and Ovadiah Yosef, Israel's most powerful rabbi, who had just denounced the secular education minister, Yossi Sarid, as Haman and wished for his death.

Ironically, the pope's decisive breakthrough with Israelis occurred during his visit to Yad Vashem—the very event the Israeli media assumed would highlight his refusal to condemn Pius XII's silence during the Holocaust. But, as the pope moved among the elderly Holocaust survivors from Wadowice, Israelis forgot the apology issue; suddenly "Christian love" didn't seem an oxymoron. The next morning's headlines in the Hebrew press all focused on the pope's solidarity with Jewish suffering; none emphasized the absence of yet another apology.

Indeed, the image of the young Israeli prime minister standing erect as a soldier beside the elderly pope bent in prayer reminded Israelis how much has changed since the Holocaust. Perhaps it was that combination of Jewish vigor and Christian brokenness that allowed Israelis to accept Prime Minister Ehud Barak's remarkably conciliatory speech. There was no public criticism of Barak for failing to rebuke the pope. Like David Ben-Gurion forcing a traumatized Jewish people to reconcile with Konrad Adenauer's Germany, Barak in effect told the Jewish world that it was time to stop the historical scorekeeping and begin treating the church as a friend. That message of Jewish self-confidence could have come only from the leader of a sovereign Jewish state.

Both Barak and John Paul offered the essential gestures each side needed for reconciliation. At Yad Vashem, Barak implicitly told the church that Jews would stop linking it to the evil of the Nazis. And at the Western Wall—where Christian pilgrims once came to gloat about the fall of the temple—the pope implicitly told the Jewish people that he welcomed their return home. When the pope placed the text of his March 12 apology in a crevice of the wall, Israelis finally grasped its significance. What had been considered inadequate in Rome was embraced in Jerusalem.

The exception was the Orthodox, who mostly remained inconsolable. Chief Rabbi Yisrael Meir Lau was the most conciliatory, saying that "the Jews have a friend in the Vatican." But even that statement revealed a medieval mentality that seeks the protection of the "good goy"—as if the Vatican itself hadn't reversed its theological contempt. And for the ultra-Orthodox, committed to preserving the pre-Holocaust world of Eastern Europe, a philo-Semitic church challenges their defiance of time: for Jews to remain the same, so must Christians. Religious nationalists, desperate for symbols of hostility, focused on the image of John Paul holding hands with Yasir Arafat—on Purim, no less, the festival of Jewish survival. It confirmed what they needed to believe: The church remains the enemy. Of the Cabinet's seven Orthodox ministers, only one—Rabbi Michael Melchior, from the small liberal religious party Meimad—bothered to greet the pope at the airport and then again at the Western Wall.

Still, Melchior's presence proved that Orthodoxy is at least struggling with itself. And the pilgrimage put the isolationists on the defensive. The widely reported ultra-Orthodox campaign to prevent the pope's Saturday Mass in Nazareth abruptly ceased once the government made clear it wouldn't give in. When the Israeli majority repudiates the ghetto, the isolationists are left to grumble on the sidelines.

One consequence is a new Israeli sensitivity to Christian concerns. An editorial in the newspaper *Ma'ariv* noted the importance for Israel of a vigorous Christian Arab presence—the first time in memory that any public Israeli voice seemed to care whether Christians stayed or emigrated. If the scandal over the construction of a mosque beside Nazareth's Basilica of the Annunciation had broken after the papal visit, the Israeli government would almost certainly have responded more sympathetically to the Christian position.

For me, the defining "Israeli" moment of the pilgrimage was watching the live broadcast of the Mass on the shores of the Sea of Galilee. Israeli flags rimmed the area; an Israeli helicopter brought the pope to the site. Suddenly I realized: I am hosting the papal Mass. Watching the tens of thousands of pilgrims waving their national flags, I found myself unexpectedly feeling gratitude for Jesus. Jews traditionally blamed Jesus for their woes; but, as an Israeli, I could appreciate him for connecting the Christian world to my country, enhancing this land with prayer. I thought of the secular Zionist pioneers who'd founded the first kibbutzim along the Sea of Galilee; little did they realize that welcoming Jesus home would be Zionism's final gift of healing to the Jews.

YOSSI KLEIN HALEVI

YOSSI KLEIN HALEVI, a senior writer for *The Jerusalem Report*, is writing a book about the three faiths in the Holy Land.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Priva

THERE ARE VOICES in the Medicare debate arguing that prescription medicines can only be provided by big government programs and managed by government bureaucrats.

We have a different outlook. We're America's pharmaceutical companies. Breakthroughs are our business.

Those emphasizing bureaucratic government solutions in the Medicare debate have a new, improbable concern — the private sector won't rise to the challenge of providing meaningful drug coverage for Medicare beneficiaries. These individuals have little faith in the innovations of the private insurance market, a market that in the last decade has introduced new products and responded to consumer needs.

We find this wrongheaded, and we're not alone. Respected actuaries and economists find that private market drug coverage is a real solution. And over 150,000,000 Americans are currently provided a prescription drug benefit through America's private insurance market. We are confident these same markets will be opportunistic and move to offer a variety of drug coverage options for America's seniors.

In contrast to those who view big government as the solution, we have a ***Can Do*** view of the private sector. Breakthroughs are our business!

Can D
Over 150 million Americans
have drug coverage provided through
the private insurance market.
We have a "can do" view of this market
when it comes to seniors...
and we're not alone!

PhRMA

Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America

Leading the Way in the Search for Cures

WWW.SEARCHFORCURES.ORG

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When we announced our Trillion Dollar Commitment, some people doubted we could do it. We did it. And now we're ready to double it.

Six years ago, we set a goal for ourselves. To commit a trillion dollars to help ten million working families have homes of their own by the end of the year 2000. That's right. One trillion dollars. An amount of money no private company had ever committed to invest.

Who has this commitment helped? All kinds of families. Ten million low- and moderate-income families, minorities, immigrants, people with special housing needs, and those living in distressed communities.

Our dedication has been steadfast and complete. And now we can proudly say that our hard work has paid off and our goal has been met — in fact, even exceeded — sooner than we ever dreamed. And we can proudly say ten million-*plus* working families benefited from our Trillion Dollar Commitment. And that means today more Americans have homes of their own than at any time in our nation's history.

But at Fannie Mae, we won't stop until every barrier is knocked down and more and more families find their dreams of owning homes can come true. So now we're committing two trillion dollars — that's right, $2,000,000,000,000 — over the next ten years to give our mortgage lender partners, housing leaders, and communities everywhere the tools they need to further expand homeownership.

That's our commitment. As well as our promise. To continue working with our lender partners to help more working families live the American Dream of homeownership.

FannieMae

www.fanniemae.com

Visit www.fanniemae.com/trilliondollarsuccess to learn more about Fannie Mae's unprecedented commitment to increase homeownership opportunities in America.

©2000, Fannie Mae. All rights reserved.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Going Down Geneva

"FLOODS OF LIGHT are about to be cast/where hitherto there was darkness." So wrote a British poet years ago, and the wicked words nicely describe the sudden awakenings to reality that have accumulated in the aftermath of the diplomatic failure in Geneva. Hafez al-Assad "is being very hard-line," a White House staffer vouchsafed to *The Washington Post* about Bill Clinton's issueless encounter with the Syrian autarch. Another "senior administration official" reported his realization that "these are substantive issues [and] it's not obvious that those differences can be bridged." In Israel, meanwhile, the hard-boiled Ehud Barak also proclaimed a new clarity. "The positions have become clear," he told his party, "and the masks are off."

But the masks have been off for a long time. And Assad has been very hard-line for a long time. And for a long time it has been obvious that some of the differences between Israel and Syria cannot be bridged. It is discouraging to discover these Americans and this Israeli only now disabused. Which serious student of Assad expected anything else? In recent months, however, we have been witnessing a strange revival of illusions about Syria. Recent American policy and recent Israeli policy have proposed to treat Syria as a state of which flexibility and fairness may be expected. In Geneva, Clinton discovered that Assad is not prepared to compromise even over a few hundred yards of land to the east of the Sea of Galilee. He wants Syrian sovereignty right down to the waterline, and the return of the entirety of the Golan Heights; and he wants all of this not as the consequence of a deal, but as the condition for a deal. As the consequence of a deal, Assad will graciously accept the modernization of the Syrian military by American aid, and an American understanding that the normalization of relations between Syria and Israel is still a matter for the end of history.

When one looks closely at the deal that the United States is attempting to broker, one must conclude that the differences between Israel and Syria not only cannot be bridged, but also should not be bridged. The peace that is eluding the diplomats consists of the exchange of a weak Syria without the Golan Heights for a strong Syria with the Golan Heights. It is a peace, in other words, that furthers the cause of Israeli security not at all. What can Barak, Israel's prince of security, be thinking?

The answer that is often given to this deeply vexing question is that he is thinking about Lebanon. It is now an axiom of Israeli policy that Israel needs the cooperation of Syria, which controls Hezbollah and the other political bandits of Lebanon, for its withdrawal from Lebanon in July to work. In the aftermath of the Genevan fiasco, it is said that an Israeli withdrawal not in the context of a Syrian deal will only provoke more Lebanese violence. These assumptions are specious. If Syria does control the terrorists in Lebanon, then let it exercise this control now, as proof of its goodwill. And if Syria does not control the terrorists in Lebanon, then it is irrelevant to Israel's position at the border with Lebanon, and Israel should secure its northern sector with no look back at this hollow hunt for a handshake.

The urgency of an accord with Syria is as negligible as its likelihood. The urgent task for Israeli diplomacy, rather, is peace with the Palestinians. And there is no doubt that Barak's and Clinton's mischievous pursuit of Syria complicates, and even imperils, the completion of the already tormented peace with the Palestinians. Morally and historically, the Palestinians are Israel's primary interlocutors. The Syrians are not. Since Camp David and Oslo, and since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Syria has been only a small, weak, nasty state striking attitudes of feckless belligerence and empty pride in the hope of not disappearing from the consciousness of the world altogether. If Barak and Clinton propose to ask Israel to acquiesce in the establishment of a Palestinian state on most of the occupied territories, then they are mad to also ask Israel to acquiesce in a return to its 1967 border with Syria. Surely that would be asking a little too much for much too little.

There is something grotesque about Clinton's chase after Assad. For a start, he seems to be operating on his customary premise that he can charm or emote his way to a deal; that all that is missing from a tough negotiation is a few more rounds of I and Thou. Needless to say, Assad's heart of stone has proved immune to the psycho-diplomatic strategy. But there is also a more fundamental question. Why must the Israelis negotiate with the Americans, so that the Americans can negotiate with the Syrians? If the Syrians do not wish to talk with the Israelis, then they are in no meaningful sense a partner to a peace process. Clinton should not have experienced Geneva as a disappointment. He should have experienced it as an outrage. The Syrian position does not represent tough diplomacy. It represents no diplomacy at all. Surprise! ■

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NOTEBOOK

SOFT IN THE HEAD: Vice President Al Gore clearly craved John McCain's stamp of approval when he unveiled his campaign finance plan last week, but the Arizona senator didn't offer it. Instead, McCain questioned Gore's credibility, which is understandable, and urged the vice president to "renounce soft money now," which is nuts. Sure, McCain pledged in mid-December that, if selected as his party's nominee, he would order the Republican National Committee to accept no soft money. But then it was an entirely painless proposition. He knew that both Gore and Bill Bradley had already vowed that they would refuse soft money, provided that their Republican opponent did the same. For Gore to renounce soft money now, however—running against a Bush operation that has every intention of accepting it—would be painful at best and, at worst, suicidal. McCain's challenge to Gore displays a certain kind of honor, but less the kind he showed on the campaign trail than the kind that usually thrives in Washington—a principled demand that the guys on the other side of the aisle fall on their swords.

POPULISM HAS ITS PRICE


DEMOCRATS
CONTINUING THE POPULIST TRADITION
Yes, I/we will attend Democrats 2000's 15th Anniversary Celebration honoring Senator Tom Harkin, Representative Lane Evans, and Jim Hightower
Individual Ticket $250
I would like to purchase ____ tickets at $250 each, paid with personal check.
PAC or Corporate Ticket $500
I would like to purchase ____ tickets at $500 each, paid with PAC, corporate, or personal check.
PAC or Corporate Sponsor $2,500
Two seats, preferred seating.
Patron $5,000
Ten seats, preferred seating.
Partner $10,000
Ten seats, preferred seating with an Honoree.
I am/We are unable to attend the Dinner, but would like to contribute $ _____ to support the efforts of Democrats2000.

WITH FRIENDS LIKE THESE: On March 22, the GOP-controlled House of Representatives spitefully passed a bill that urged the Clinton administration to cut off aid and military sales to the eleven countries that make up the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) unless those countries increase their oil production. Judging from the debate preceding the vote, the bill was specifically targeted at Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. "We're being screwed by the people we defended," fumed Representative Dana Rohrabacher of California. Blustered Representative Donald Manzullo of Illinois, "This is not the way you thank the United States. American blood was shed to protect Saudi Arabia and Kuwait from being overrun." Thank the United States? Perhaps Rohrabacher and Manzullo have forgotten that it was in America's economic self-interest to keep Kuwait and Saudi Arabia independent from Iraq—lest Saddam Hussein gain control of those countries' oil reserves. But it is not fashionable in Republican circles these days to admit that America actually has interests in the rest of the world. Much better to cast all U.S. involvement as charity—with the implication that it is charity we can no longer afford. Oh, and one more thing: Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have actually been lobbying their fellow OPEC countries for oil output to increase.

RED-INK PLANET: Last week's report by investigators looking into NASA's recent Mars failures criticizes the agency's "better, faster, cheaper" approach and advocates higher spending. That is, the report is an aerospace contractor's dream. For a decade now, NASA Administrator Dan Goldin has been pressuring the aerospace lobby to cut costs and has admirably refused to proclaim that his agency cannot survive without budget increases. And the good-old-boy network hates him for it. Since the Mars failures, the aerospace old-boys' criticisms of Goldin, and their calls for more expensive missions, have grown particularly shrill. To Al Gore's credit (the vice president oversees the space agency), he has stood by Goldin in the face of such whining from what is, after all, a powerful—not to mention California-based—lobby. (Dan Quayle, who originally picked Goldin for the job, gets credit in retrospect, too.) But journalists have fared less well, uncritically passing along complaints about NASA spending without noting the aerospace industry's self-interest in higher prices. Nor have reporters often pointed out that, the embarrassing Mars failures aside, almost everything done under Goldin's "better, faster, cheaper" approach—including every space-shuttle launch—has worked. What's more, barely any stories on this week's Mars report mentioned one of its greatest faults: If there really isn't enough money per program, why not just cut down on the number of programs? After all, what's the hurry to explore Mars? It will still be there in every future appropriations cycle.

NOT EASY LISTENING: The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) has been decidedly unhappy about the Federal Communications Commission's recent decision to license low-power radio stations and give them previously unused space on the FM dial. The NAB, undoubtedly worried about protecting its market share, claims that the low-power stations, which broadcast at anywhere from one to 100 watts, will interfere with the bigger stations—which typically broadcast at around 50,000 watts—that already reside on the dial. So, as part of its efforts to kill the FCC's low-power radio initiative, the NAB recently flooded Capitol Hill offices with copies of a compact disc that purportedly demonstrated the type of interference that would occur on listeners' radios if the low-power stations were to go on the air. Courtesy of the NAB's CD, Capitol

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hill denizens were treated to the aggravating "cross talk" of two radio stations, which is kind of like the sound that can be heard on a cordless phone when it crosses lines with another phone. The CD has had its intended effect—more than 150 representatives have signed on as sponsors of the Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act, a bill introduced by Ohio Republican Representative Michael Oxley that scuttles the low-power initiative. Unfortunately, though, the CD is a bit of a sham. To generate the annoying cross talk, the NAB simply took two previously recorded radio programs and mixed them together in a sound studio; the result was, according to the NAB, a "simulation" of what would happen if a low-power radio station were placed close to another station on the FM dial. The NAB can't say for certain what might really happen if that occurred, since it didn't run any actual tests. The FCC, on the other hand, has conducted such tests. According to Bruce Franca, deputy chief of the FCC's office of engineering and technology, the tests show that in most instances there's no interference at all; when it does occur, it comes in the form of "hissing and popping," not cross talk. Says Franca, "It's the difference between sitting in a movie theater and hearing an air conditioner versus hearing somebody whispering in the seat behind you." Maybe someone should whisper that to the folks on the Hill.

WORSHIPERS OF HERA: "God does not forbid women to be leaders in society, but when that occurs it's usually because of the abdication of men. As in the situation of Deborah and Barak, there's a certain shame attached to it. I would vote for a woman for the presidency, in some situations, but again, there's a certain shame attached. Why don't you have a man who's able to step forward? God's Word says very plainly that an elder is to be a man; he is to be the husband of one wife. It's harder when there are women who are CEOs of companies and so forth. Still, it comes down to the question of 'Do we trust God and do we believe that He has wisdom that we don't have.'"—George W. Bush adviser Marvin Olasky, in a recent interview with the *Journal for Biblical Manhood and Womanhood.* ■

VINT'S WEEK

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dear Village
Doing Jack

By Douglas McGrath

Dear village,

It is I, Fyodor Pashenko, chairman of Young Russians for a Perfect Tomorrow. I continue to study the American elections so that we might make better our young democracy.

I have been spending my time with Texas Governor George W. Bush. The other night after dinner, I was in the kitchen with his parents, who spend their leisure time just like ordinary men and women. Former President Bush was knitting mittens with the presidential seal on them, and Mrs. Bush was skinning a rabbit. I asked her if she was going to cook it. "No," she said. "It just relaxes me."

Also with us was Father O'Day, a Roman Catholic priest who will live with the governor until the election. He's actually an actor named Saul Konigsberg, and he is quite an amusing gentleman. He was drinking Jack Daniels and teaching me a most diverting game called three-card monte when we heard the governor scream upstairs.

President Bush was so startled that he jabbed himself with a knitting needle. "Careful!" Mrs. Bush said. "You'll get blood on your apron!"

Saul gave him a shot of Jack Daniels. "Jack is good for pain," he said.

President Bush picked up a sponge. "Don't know if you're up on your household hints there, Fido, but club soda mixed with ground-up aspirin is an ideal way to remove even the peskiest bloodstains from clothes and carpets." Then he added, rather sadly, "Just something I picked up since John Q. Public handed me my hat back in '92."

Right at that moment the governor came down the stairs in his *Toy Story* pajamas. "I had a dream!" he said, agitatedly pulling at his hair. "I had a dream!"

"Don't go Martin Luther King there on us, Little Me," President Bush said. "And, from the looks of you, it sounds like *nightmare's* more the ticket wordwise. Tell us what happened."

Little George shivered as he began. "It was the South Carolina primary again, and old Johnny Mac and I were in a debate. And everybody kept telling me I had to finish Johnny off, that it was now or never. So I did it all again. I praised Bob Jones. I brought up that phony charge that Johnny Mac was against breast-cancer research even though his own sister had the disease. I attacked his military service even though the closest I came to action in the National Guard was getting clipped by a champagne cork at the Mansion Bar in Dallas. When I finished, I looked over, and old Johnny Mac was crying his eyes out like I'd really hurt him."

President Bush said gravely, "Seeing another man shed his salt water is a nightmare."

"That's not the bad part," the governor said. "The bad part is, then I *lost*. Can you imagine? With my intelligence? How humilifying! But what's it mean that I dreamed that?"

"Hey, don't climb up on the couch and start Freuding out on us, Little Me," said President Bush.

"It was just a bad dream, Little Him," Mrs. Bush said to her son. "Have a piece of Mama's beef jerky."

"Jack goes good with jerky," Saul said.

"No, y'all," the governor said. "I may not be a psychoanalyst, but my national intelligence tells me that this dream means something. It means not only have I won but I've lost. I had to swing right to beat Johnny Mac, but the general voting pop doesn't want an anti-Catholic fringer in the Oval O. Unless I can correct my image, I'm going to lose to that Buddha smoocher in November. So the $64,000 Q is, how do we fix this? And I think I have the answer. I'll go on TV, mano a mano with Barbara Walters. And I'll look straight past her big hair into the eyes of the American people and tell 'em what's in my heart."

"Pass the Jack," Mrs. Bush said to Saul.

"Let me read you a rough draft," the governor said. "'Good evening, American people. I'd like to thank you for your support in the recent primaries out there back whenever it was that I beat Johnny Mac and that funny black guy who kept showing up. But some of my views got misconstructed by the press. Primarily, I was accused of being anti-Catholic, just because I spoke at a school where every room comes equipped with a stick and a piñata of the pope. Well, I want you to know that if you give me your trust and let me have my own set of keys to 1600 Pennsylvania Lane, I will never take a swat at the pope. Even if the old conehead makes a crack about my mom.'"

It was pretty quiet. "Y'all don't like it?" The governor's face turned red. "I bet you would've liked it IF JEBBY CAME UP WITH IT!" He ran back up to his room.

President Bush turned to Saul. "Maybe you could help him there, Padre. Always calms a fella down to talk to a man of the cloth."

"I know how to reach him," said Saul. "My *Sports Illustrated* swimsuit issue came today."

And then, dear village, there was a most exciting development. The telephone rang and it was the vice president, Al Gore, calling for me! He'd heard that I was studying Governor Bush and wanted me to study him, too. He said I could be present at the birth of a new day of honor in American politics. Then he described his plan for an endowment fund for campaign financing. Luckily, Saul left his Jack nearby, so I was able to get through it. After a while, it even started to sound good. When I asked what lessons the primaries have taught him so far, he said, "Image is everything." He said that's what Russia needed: a new image that will make us sound more successful. His suggestion: Russia.com. So the next time I write you, I will be with the vice president! I feel I can learn a lot from him. (But I better bring the Jack, just in case.) ■

Douglas McGrath is a writer and filmmaker.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Capitol Repair Kit

While Washington burns with partisan rhetoric, we cool the air with clear-headed, innovative solutions to some of the nation's most unyielding problems. And we have fun doing it. **The Washington Monthly** explores the quirks, cons, and paralysis that too often underpin American politics—then we offer a sensible way out. *The New York Observer* says we are the magazine "to which anyone who gives a damn about this country must subscribe."

SUBSCRIBE NOW AND SAVE!

❑ YES! Enter my subscription for a full year (10 issues) to **The Washington Monthly** for only $29.95.

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State ___ Zip _____

❑ Payment enclosed ❑ Bill me later

Charge my ❑ VISA ❑ MasterCard

Credit Card # _____ Exp. _____

The Washington Monthly

Box 587

Mount Morris, IL 61054

For Canadian and other foreign subscriptions add $7. Please remit U.S. funds.

A0402

"... holds up a deadly accurate mirror to the Washington political culture, exposing its hypocrisies, stupidities, and unexpected triumphs." — *Michael Beschloss*



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the Hill

Intentional Foul

By JAKE HALPERN

WANT TO BUILD a pipe bomb? Assemble a land mine? Construct a flamethrower? Go to the Internet—where booksellers offer dozens of antisocial how-to manuals. You can probably get the books within 24 hours and be blowing things up the next day.

Worrisome? Senators Dianne Feinstein and Orrin Hatch thought so, and so last year they pushed through the Senate a bill that bans the publication or dissemination of information on bomb-making. Website operators, newspapers, publishing houses, or booksellers that violated the ban would face up to ten years in prison. The impact of the ban was immediate—especially online. As soon as President Clinton signed Feinstein and Hatch's bill into law last August, Paladin Press, a publisher and bookseller that promotes itself as "home of the action library," removed 75 books on explosives and extreme weapons—with titles like *How to Destroy Bridges* and *Breath of the Dragon: Homebuilt Flamethrowers*—from its online store. Loompanics, another niche publisher and bookseller, also took explosives-related books off its website. "This is a powerful set of amendments, which I am convinced can do a great deal to reduce criminal violence in America," said Feinstein on the bill's behalf.

Don't be so sure. Log on to the Web right now and you can find another online vendor that sells almost all the titles Paladin and Loompanics no longer do. What's more, unlike those two companies, which operate relatively bare-bones sites, this bookseller includes helpful reviews from previous customers. *Breath of the Dragon* draws this rave: "I just bought this book two months ago and built a flamethrower, boy it is one hell of a hobby weapon." Another reader gushes about *Chemistry of Powder and Explosives*, "I read this book and realized I could become an expert bomber."

Why isn't this online bookseller also running for cover? Because the seller in question is Amazon.com, and it, along with other big-time booksellers, is virtually immune from the new law. All of which makes Feinstein and Hatch's legislation something of a sham.

The problem is that in trying to ensure that their legislation wasn't so broad as to be unconstitutional, Feinstein and Hatch applied it only to sellers who "intend" the bomb-making information to be used to commit crimes. Booksellers like Amazon.com (not to mention Barnes & Noble and Borders) sell every kind of book imaginable, from *Curious George* to *Mein Kampf*—so they can plausibly argue that they intend only to amass profits and satisfy customers. Paladin and Loompanics, on the other hand, publish carefully selected collections aimed at highly specific niche markets; both companies have mission statements that stress, among other things, self-defense, military preparedness, and survivalism. Proving their "intent" isn't hard—as a federal court demonstrated three years ago, when it ruled that the family of a man killed by someone who had read the Paladin title *Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors* could sue the company.

But, in trying to separate wholesome, mainstream booksellers from fringe outfits, Feinstein and Hatch have not only created a loophole big enough to fit a flamethrower through; they've also subverted their efforts at constitutionality. Without the "intent" clause, the bill is unconstitutionally broad. But with it the bill discriminates against some sellers, which probably also makes it unconstitutional. "The problem with judging intent is that it can create favoritism and selective censorship," says Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School.

GIVEN THESE PROBLEMS, you'd think the Feinstein-Hatch duo might call its efforts to a halt. Quite the opposite: Using their bomb-making law as a model, the two recently authored another piece of legislation—this one about making drugs. As part of a larger bill that targeted methamphetamine manufacturers, Feinstein and Hatch inserted a measure to ban the publication and dissemination of all information on illegal drug-making. Last November, the bill sailed through the Senate. It is now before the House.

Like their bomb-making legislation, Feinstein and Hatch's drug bill relies on "intent." And once again, not surprisingly, niche publishers and booksellers are scared. Michael Hoy, the president of Loompanics, has already vowed to remove from the company's website his entire stock of drug-making books—which includes titles like *Indoor Marijuana Horticulture* and *Opium for the Masses*—if the bill becomes law. "I don't want to go to prison for ten years," he says. The famously pro-marijuana magazine *High Times*, which in recent years has operated a lucrative online bookstore, is currently consulting its lawyers. "Our entire website may have to come down," says multimedia director John Holmstrom. (Even the magazine itself might be imperiled if the bill becomes law.)

Meanwhile, across the Web at Amazon.com, all but two of Loompanics's drug books are offered. You can still buy the company's classics, like *Hydroponic Heroin*, which is paired with a glowing reader review: "Learn how to easily make your own heroin.... I made a batch of opium seed tea the first night I read the book! I wigged hard! Thanx." Other Loompanics titles, like *Opium for the Masses*, have equally appreciative reviews: "[A]fter 30 minutes of reading this book, I was so excited about opium I could barely contain myself!" Amazon.com actually boasts a prodigious collection of books about drugs, with 332 titles on marijuana alone—yet it has no plans to take any of these off its virtual shelves. "We sell the whole range of books," explains Amazon.com representative Patty Smith, "and I can't see how this law would impact our practices." That's the problem. ■

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The greatest political thinkers in history... The ideas that shape our world

Power Over People: Classical and Modern Political Theory offers 16 lectures on audio- or videocassette by one of America's most prominent scholars

Like most intellectually curious people, you are driven to understand the larger ideas beneath the surface of current events. You've often wondered why the world is the way it is. You've probably spent considerable energy poring over the writings of a great thinker in hopes of better grasping fundamental ideas about government, power, and the individual in society.

Unfortunately, as well, you've probably found your thirst for knowledge thwarted by the many demands modern life makes on your time. After all, with the pace of life as it is, it's hard enough to read the news, much less comprehend the full scope of the historical forces behind it.

But finally there's a way for you to fill the gaps without putting your life on hold. Available on audio- or videocassette, **Power Over People: Classical and Modern Political Theory** is a cross-cultural exploration of 2,500 years of political philosophy that enables you to grasp the full panoply of our heritage in a surprisingly short amount of time. If you spend just 45 minutes a day—while commuting, relaxing at home, or even exercising—you'll achieve a sure grasp of the minds and ideas that have shaped our time, in little more than two weeks! And in the process, you'll feel exhilarated and proud to be among the few who really understand the story behind the story.

"Superlatives are inadequate."

—Patricia Hall, Washougal, WA

Because we hand-picked Professor Dennis Dalton from a short list of top-rated instructors in elite universities, you can be sure not only that his course will be focused, accurate and relevant, but that you will enjoy intellectual stimulation of the highest order. Professor Dalton is that rare teacher who combines erudition, an unparalleled fluency with his subject, and the ability to awaken others' passion for learning.

In this course, he invites you to examine some of the fundamental questions that have shaped Western political thought since its inception in ancient Athens, together with some of the most influential answers that political theorists have proposed.

Prof. Dalton's wide-ranging exploration of power and its use is kept focused by his masterful use of comparisons—he contrasts Plato's idealism with Aristotle's realism, Marx's optimism with Freud's pessimism, and Hitler's exclusionism and exaltation of violence with Gandhi's inclusionism and insistence on non-violence. You'll take a fascinating journey that prompts you to think more deeply about yourself, the standards that guide you, and your ties to society.

"In regards to Power Over People, *I am more than astounded and dazzled...this is an incredibly interesting course."*

—Diana Owens, Gualala, CA

So take advantage of this opportunity to learn from one of America's finest teachers without paperwork, giant tuition bills, or inflexible schedules.

We're so sure of the quality of our product that our guarantee of satisfaction is ironclad: If at any time you are not completely satisfied with this course, you can immediately exchange it for another or we can refund your money promptly.

THE COURSE CURRICULUM

Part I

Lecture 1: The Hindu Vision of Life
Lecture 2: Thucydides & the Peloponnesian War
Lecture 3: Law & Rule in Sophocles' *Antigone*
Lecture 4 Socrates & the Socratic Quest
Lecture 5: Plato: Idealism & Power (Part 1)
Lecture 6: Plato: Idealism & Power (Part 2)
Lecture 7: Aristotle's Critique of Plato's *Republic*
Lecture 8: Machiavelli's Theory of Power Politics

Part II

Lecture 9: Rousseau's Theory of Human Nature & Society
Lecture 10: Marx's Critique of Capitalism & Solution of Communism
Lecture 11: Freud's Theory of Human Nature & Civilization
Lecture 12: Thoreau's Theory of Civil Disobedience
Lecture 13: Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor
Lecture 14: The Idea of Anarchism & the Example of Emma Goldman
Lecture 15: Hitler's Use of Power
Lecture 16: Gandhi's Use of Power

For more information on this and other Teaching Company courses, visit our website at: www.teachco.com

DENNIS G. DALTON, Ph.D., is the Ann Whitney Olin Professor of Political Science at Barnard College, Columbia University. Professor Dalton has been honored with numerous scholarships and grants, including the Gandhi Peace Foundation Grant. Professor Dalton has written numerous articles about political theory, both classical and modern. He is a member of both the American Political Science Association and the Association for Asian Studies. Professor Dalton also is the author of *The Indian Idea of Freedom.*

NO-RISK MONEY-BACK GUARANTEE!

SAVE OVER 60%! OFFER EXPIRES JUNE 9, 2000

To order, mail coupon below or call our toll-free number: (Please refer to offer code 9875)

1-800-TEACH-12 (1-800-832-2412) Fax: 1-703-912-7756

The Teaching Company®
7405 Alban Station Court, Suite A107
Springfield, VA 22150-2318

Offer Code 9875 **FREE SHIPPING!**

Please send me **Power Over People: Classical and Modern Political Theory**, which consists of sixteen 45-minute lectures on audio- or videocassette, with complete lecture outlines, and suggested reading list.

SALE ☐ Audio*: Entire two-part course $49.95 (reg. price $129.95) ~~plus $10 S&H~~.

SALE ☐ Video*: Entire two-part course $69.95 (reg. price $199.95) ~~plus $10 S&H~~.

**Note: Virginia residents please add 4.5% sales tax.*

☐ Check or Money Order enclosed

☐ VISA ☐ MasterCard ☐ ☐ DISCOVER NOVUS

ACCOUNT NUMBER

SIGNATURE EXP. DATE

NAME (PLEASE PRINT)

MAILING ADDRESS

CITY/STATE/ZIP

PHONE *(If we have questions regarding your order)*

☐ **FREE CATALOG. Please send me a free copy of your current catalog (no purchase necessary).**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Texas education myth.

Only a Test

By JONATHAN WEISMAN

WHEN GEORGE W. BUSH says he's a "reformer with results," he usually points to his state's public schools as proof. "Texas," he says, "leads the nation when it comes to improving public schools." And normally skeptical journalists tend to believe him. Just last week, *Time* rhapsodized about the Texas educational system's "galloping gains."

Bush's evidence comes from something called the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS), a standardized test administered to Lone Star students in grades three through eight and again as an exit exam in high school. Students' performance on the test determines whether their teachers and administrators advance in their careers—or perhaps even keep their jobs. While Bush didn't invent the test (it was introduced at some schools in 1990, four years before he was elected governor), he's become its biggest booster—protecting it from attacks from left and right and crowing as student scores climbed ever higher.

And they've climbed a lot higher. In 1994, the first year the test was fully implemented, 53 percent of Texas schoolchildren passed. Last year, 78 percent did. Among minorities, the improvement has been even more impressive. Passing rates for African Americans shot up from 31 percent in 1994 to 63 percent last year. Hispanics' rates leaped from 39 percent to 70 percent over the same period. "In Texas," Bush says, "we are proud of our results."

But a growing body of research is beginning to question how much these improved scores really mean. For one thing, the rising TAAS scores aren't matched by gains on other standardized tests. The National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), a basic-skills test periodically administered to a sampling of students in all 50 states, is a case in point. The 1998 NAEP did show Texas students making strong gains in writing, as well as solid improvements by fourth graders in math—echoing the results of the TAAS. But in many other subjects the TAAS improvements weren't duplicated. The percentage of Texas eighth graders passing the math section of the TAAS rose from 55 percent in 1994 to 79 percent in 1998. But on the NAEP's math portion they stalled. The percentage passing the TAAS reading section increased from 72 percent in 1994 to 83 percent in 1998. But the NAEP scores between 1992 and 1998 showed no statistical gain. And the NAEP scores contradict evidence key to Bush's self-description as a "compassionate conservative": while TAAS scores showed a remarkable narrowing of the gap between minority and white students, NAEP scores showed the gap actually widening.

That finding was underscored three years ago when a team of RAND Corporation researchers, attracted by the rising test scores, decided to study achievement gains in three Texas school districts. Just weeks after the students aced the TAAS, the RAND team selected about 1,000 elementary school students and administered its own mix of multiple-choice and open-ended questions designed to test critical-reasoning skills. While TAAS had shown virtually no correlation between socioeconomic status and academic achievement, the RAND tests showed a correlation that nearly reached the statistical limit. "We have the empirical data to show that something is really out of the ordinary in terms of these kids' behavior on these tests," says RAND's Stephen Klein about the TAAS. "Something is definitely screwy."

ASK TEXAS TEACHERS, and they'll tell you what's screwy: They're teaching their students how to take the TAAS. Last year, three researchers at the University of Texas at Austin canvassed reading instructors across the state to determine the TAAS's impact. The responses were "alarm-filled," says James V. Hoffman, a professor of language and literacy studies and the team's leader. Teachers protested that they were spending eight to ten hours a week in test-preparation drills and that their principals were pressuring them to spend even more. Only 27 percent said they believed the rising TAAS scores reflected increased learning and higher-quality teaching; half said the scores indicated nothing of the sort.

In a study published by the Harvard Civil Rights Project in January, Professors Linda McNeil of Rice University and Angela Valenzuela of the University of Texas delivered a scathing assessment of the TAAS's impact on Texas classrooms, asserting that "behind the rhetoric of the test scores are a growing set of classroom practices in which test-prep activities are usurping a substantive curriculum." Middle school students have become so accustomed to reading short passages like those found on the TAAS, wrote McNeil and Valenzuela, that they "were unable to read a novel even two years below grade level." Among McNeil and Valenzuela's other findings: Students are taught almost exclusively to write standardized, five-paragraph essays with each paragraph containing exactly five sentences, and, because science is not tested until the eighth grade, many science teachers suspend their lessons for weeks, even months, to devote science time to math drills.

But rigorous test prep isn't the only explanation for the rising TAAS scores. Schools may also be selectively exempting students from the test—thanks to rules that, until this year, granted administrators great latitude in deciding whether to test their special-education and limited-English-proficiency students. Last year, the percentage of special-ed students who took the TAAS fell from 62 percent the year before to 48 percent; districts effectively dropped 37,751 students from the 1.8 million TAAS cohort. Those students were overwhelmingly minorities. In 1998, nearly twelve percent of black students and 13 percent of Hispanics were exempted, compared to five percent of whites. In other words, minorities may have seemed to be catching up to whites in part because learning-

JONATHAN WEISMAN is White House correspondent for the Baltimore *Sun*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SIGN UP FOR YOUR 30-DAY FREE TRIAL TODAY!

WHAT ALL SMART INVESTORS HAVE IN THEIR BACK POCKET.

It's the secret play book of Wall Street, a road map to investment success, it's TheStreet.com℠. Real-time quotes, real smart tools and real bright insights by Wall Street veterans such as James J. Cramer, Adam Lashinsky, and Herb Greenberg. Come sneak a peek at TheStreet.com with a 30-day free trial, and see what the smart investor sees every day: TheStreet.com.

© Copyright 1999, TheStreet.com, Inc

www.TheStreet.com

IF IT'S ON THE STREET, IT'S ON THESTREET.COM

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disadvantaged minorities were less likely to take the test.

In some districts, even outright fraud may help explain statistical gains. Last year, a Travis County grand jury indicted administrators in the Austin school district for tampering with TAAS records. Trouble has erupted on a smaller scale in Houston and Dallas, as well.

But, before Democrats start crowing about Texas's faults, they should remember that similar pressures are disrupting schools throughout the country. Recently, for example, researchers from Johns Hopkins University released an evaluation of Maryland's highly touted "core-knowledge curriculum." They concluded that, in the rush to improve scores on the state's TAAS-like Maryland School Performance Assessment Program (a test blessed by the state's Democratic governor), only one school had actually adopted the new curriculum. "The existence of high-stakes testing programs is probably the key factor in determining the fate of reform programs such as core knowledge," the researchers concluded.

Yet Vice President Al Gore, like Bush, has embraced the standards movement with gusto, preaching the gospel of measurement and accountability. "We will not achieve excellence until we demand it," Gore has said of standards. As RAND's Klein notes, "Testing is becoming the tail that wags the dog." And it's wagging Bush and Gore both. ■

Kigali Dispatch

It Takes a Village

By ELIZABETH NEUFFER

CLOSE TO ONCE a week for the last six years, Claire Kayitare has come to the prosecutor's office in Rwanda's capital to plead for justice. Waiting in a shabby, poorly lit building along with dozens of other Rwandans on similar missions, she has kept one aim in mind: to push for a trial date for her husband, accused of taking part in Rwanda's brutal 1994 genocide and behind bars ever since.

But, on her most recent visit, Kayitare abandoned her quest. In fact, she threw over any hope at all of conventional justice. Instead, she implored prosecutors to transfer her husband's case to a proposed *gacaca* (pronounced "ga-CHA-cha") tribunal—a traditional system in which village representatives, not a government court, judge the accused. "As it stands now, it's not justice, it's revenge," said a tearful Kayitare, a handkerchief in her hand. "At least under *gacaca* the truth will come out."

Gacaca—roughly translatable as "justice in the grass"—is the Rwandan government's latest effort to apportion blame for the brutal genocide that six years ago took close to one million Rwandan lives. Once a traditional Rwandan means for settling village quarrels—such as who stole whose cow—and reintegrating offenders into the community, *gacaca* has been revamped to deal with genocide-related theft, assault, and murder. Local views about the government's plan are mixed. But this much is clear: It can't be much worse than the status quo.

RWANDA'S TUTSI-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT had hoped things wouldn't get this bad. For years the government tried, at least rhetorically, to render justice and foster reconciliation between the country's Tutsi and Hutu populations. It once thought its courts, along with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Tanzania, could mete out individual responsibility for war crimes. But mass atrocities meant a massive number of perpetrators, and it quickly became clear that the biggest question facing Rwanda's courts was neither guilt nor innocence but mathematics. There are 125,000 genocide suspects behind bars and only a handful of lawyers and judges to try them, since many were slaughtered during the genocide. Even with an infusion of foreign aid and new staff, Rwanda's courts have tried just 2,500 cases since 1996. At that pace, it would take 150 years to try all the accused. "In normal justice, we begin with the people who died and make a dossier. That's one million murder cases," notes Fiacre Birasa, the Justice Ministry's point man on *gacaca*. "One million murders—who did these? It would take us more than one million years. Can we continue down this road? Logically, no."

That's where *gacaca* comes in, aiming to deliver justice that is participatory, rehabilitative, and, most of all, swift. As currently proposed, tribunals would be established at the Rwandan equivalent of town, county, state, and federal levels—up to 10,000 tribunals across this country of six million people. In each tribunal, elected judges (replacing the village elders of old) would assemble the community, hear testimony, and investigate crimes. There would be no prosecutors or defense attorneys to delay proceedings, and judges would reward confession—offering a blend of reduced jail time and community service to those who admitted their guilt.

The genocide's masterminds would still go before regular courts, as would those who carried out particularly heinous atrocities, but the *gacaca* tribunals would handle the hordes of small-time offenders. In fact, the government hopes to dispense with an astonishing 125,000 cases in the next three years. Birasa whipped out his calculator to prove the point. The country's *gacaca* courts could try as many as 200 cases per day, he estimated. He entered some figures, then exclaimed, "*Gacaca* could try up to 75,000 people in one year!"

The prospect of a speedy trial has Rwanda's prisoners clamoring to go before *gacaca* tribunals, even though the system is barely off the drawing board. Parliament only began putting it in place this February, amending the constitution to allow *gacaca* tribunals to be supervised by the country's supreme court. The hope was that parliament would approve the *gacaca* law in April and trials might start this summer. Some think that schedule may now be delayed, since Rwanda's Tutsi-led government has been rocked by a spate of resignations, which culminated in the recent resignation of

ELIZABETH NEUFFER, an individual project fellow at the Open Society Institute, is writing a book about postwar justice in Bosnia and Rwanda.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Strong stuff

TALK ABOUT EXPLOSIVE. Talk about *The New Republic*: the award-winning journal of opinion that takes you beyond the news of politics, culture, and the arts, to the debates, dialogues, and didactics. And now we have a bold new look from cover to cover. Check it out. Subscribe now. Just fill out the attached coupon, send it in, and grab the magazine that has influenced America, its leaders and policymakers for 85 years. *The New Republic* — the most powerful opinion magazine around. And that's a fact.

THE NEW REPUBLIC

America's Preeminent Journal of Opinion

Visit our Web site at http://www.thenewrepublic.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its Hutu president, Pasteur Bizimungu. Then again, Tutsi Vice President Paul Kagame, the country's real power broker, who has temporarily taken over the presidency, may push forward a *gacaca* vote to show that Bizimungu's exit has not hampered the government's ability to get things done.

Proponents claim *gacaca* is well-suited to Rwanda. There are few secrets in this tiny country the size of Maryland, where people live in small, close-knit villages and where even the genocide was carried out in broad daylight. *Gacaca* tribunals, advocates argue, will use the moral force of the assembled village to shame perpetrators into admitting the truth. And, once that has occurred, an appropriate, rehabilitative penalty can be quickly devised. "In Western law, only the accused, the judge, and the victims are involved—so you only get a small part of truth," said Justice Minister Jean de Dieu Mucyo. "But, if you involve many people in a trial together, you get the truth. Nothing stands between survivors and the implicated."

BUT NOT EVERYONE is so optimistic. About an hour outside Kigali, in a ridgeline village known as Taba commune, a group of female genocide survivors gathered in a mud hut last month to discuss the role *gacaca* will play in their lives. All were witnesses when the International Criminal Tribunal brought proceedings against their mayor, Jean-Paul Akayesu. Their testimony has cost them dearly, although they say they don't regret it. Several have been harassed and threatened, and, when speaking to a stranger, they still insist on using their court-assigned pseudonyms. The problem with *gacaca*, several noted, is that in most communities survivors are too outnumbered to have a voice. Precisely because a *gacaca* tribunal draws on the moral force of the village, it is more likely to represent the views of the Hutu, who are the majority, than the Tutsi, who were the bulk of those killed. "The truth will never be known," scoffed Witness P.P. "You are one survivor, and, in front of you, you have twenty people and the family of that killer. What you say will not be considered. There will be no one else to confirm it." Victims' groups agree, fearing that *gacaca* will result in a blanket amnesty for genocidal killers.

Human rights advocates worry about *gacaca* for a different reason: They point to the utter lack of safeguards for defendants and fear the proceedings might devolve into a Rwandan version of the Salem witch trials. *Gacaca* is supposed to represent a kind of indigenous Rwandan justice. But the reality is that Rwandans don't have a long history of due process; they're used to submitting to authority. Many fear *gacaca* trials will end up not as popular justice but as another form of state control. Even government officials admit the risk. "*Gacaca* will have problems—it would not be honest to say it will be perfect," said Gerald Gahima, Rwanda's attorney general. "You are requiring people to sit in judgment of their friends, their relatives. The conflict of interest is apparent."

But, with tens of thousands of cases still pending, officials insist there's no other choice. "Ordinary courts can never deal with the backlog of all the cases. I think *gacaca* ought to be given a chance. If it doesn't work...." Gahima's voice trails off, and he wipes his eyes tiredly. "Then we will simply have to try something else." ■

Tel Aviv Postcard

Dusk

By MARTIN PERETZ

POPE JOHN PAUL II'S visit to *terra sancta* evoked several themes. The most profound was his brave effort, unpopular within much of the church hierarchy, to palliate the bitter relationship between the followers of Jesus and the people that denies that Jesus' testament supersedes its own. This loyalty to their vision of the divine has brought the Jews merciless persecution—from the Catholic Church, from virtually every schismatic Christian church, and from numerous princes and potentates whose cruelty served the pious ideal. And now this pope, this astonishing pope, has conceded the whole brutal narrative.

No wonder he was welcomed by the Jewish state—and by the 30 Israeli survivors of the Jewish catastrophe who hail from his hometown of Wadowice, some of whom witnessed his decency during the Nazi nightmare. Again and again during his visit to Israel, and most stirringly before the monumental golden stones of the Western Wall, the pope spoke of Judaism not as an errant doctrine but as the very source of monotheism. "God of our fathers, you chose Abraham and his descendants to bring your Name to the Nations," he said. John Paul is an exemplary man. And, like most moral models, he has not been adequately emulated.

Nor did he himself have many models to emulate. The interaction between Zionism and the papacy is long and unhappy. In 1904, Theodore Herzl raised the idea of a Jewish state in a Vatican audience with Pius X. The pope listened carefully and then told his supplicant, according to Herzl's diaries, that it was a vision "that we cannot support." But, if the Jews did settle in Palestine, Pius noted helpfully, "we would prepare churches and priests to convert them all."

Pius XII also disliked Zionism. And that distaste cannot be disentangled from his silence in the face of the genocide that gave the Jewish state its final justification. Pius XII tried to rally the Catholic U.N. member states against the 1947 Partition Plan for Palestine. When that failed, he urged that Jerusalem become a *corpus separatum*—an international city whose government the church might dominate. That gambit failed as well, since the Arab states and the Arabs of Palestine refused any provisions for partition. But the Vatican's infatuation with an internationalized Jerusalem has endured. As Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Tauran recently put it, Jerusalem ought to be "protected by a special law backed by international guarantees." John Paul, so unlike Pius XII in so many ways, has continued this unfortunate legacy. And, worse, he has begun proceedings to bestow on his shameful predecessor the ultimate honor: sainthood. But, if John Paul believes Pius XII a saint, does he also believe that people of power are justified in remaining silent when, in the words of a recent Vatican document, "women and men, old

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and young ... for the sole reason of their Jewish origin, were degraded, ill-treated, tortured, and utterly robbed of their human dignity"? Of course he doesn't. But Pius *was* silent. And the pope cannot fully honor the Holocaust's victims while honoring its enablers as well.

JOHN PAUL DID not come alone. He brought with him perhaps 50,000 Christian pilgrims. But most of the traffic, for a long time now, has headed the other way. To be an indigenous Christian in the Holy Land, indeed in the entire Middle East, is to carry much more than a metaphorical cross. The Assyrian Christians of Iraq were murdered decades ago. The Coptic Christians of Egypt are continually persecuted—not only by Muslim extremists but by a regime fed by U.S. money. There are almost no Christians in Saudi Arabia, save those foreigners in the diplomatic service, in business, and in the armed services of Western countries. And even they may not worship publicly. Once, on a flight between Riyadh and Jeddah, I sat next to a woman from the American South. Working as a teacher, she'd been living in Saudi Arabia for many years with her husband and children. I asked her whether she was a Christian. She answered, "Yes, a Christian in the catacombs." She was a Catholic, and she told me the difficulties she had getting her children confirmed. "There was this defrocked priest in the Italian Embassy, and every so often he'd give his servants a holiday. That's when he celebrated Mass for needy Catholics, and on one of these occasions my twins had their confirmation." And then she added, "Last November, when I arrived in Riyadh from Germany, where I was visiting my sister, I brought a plastic Christmas tree with me for the holidays. It was confiscated at customs as a religious object."

The ironies are legion. In almost all its incarnations, Arab nationalism is a creation of Christians, who hoped their loyalty to a secular brotherhood would insulate them from Islam's mass mobilizations. This is how Iraqi nationalism began and spread throughout the Arab world. Even today, the most notable leaders of Palestinian rejectionism are Christians—from the rogue terrorists headquartered in Damascus to Peter Jennings's favorite Palestinian, Hanan Ashrawi, to one-time Arafat flack turned impassioned enemy Edward Said of Morningside Heights, New York.

But, on the ground, Palestinian Christians are an endangered species. Legendary Christian towns like Jericho, Ramallah, and Bethlehem are now mostly Muslim. In 1944, 40,000 Christians lived in Arab Jerusalem. They lived for two decades under Jordanian sovereignty, and their numbers plummeted. Israeli rule gave them some relief, but the intifada, with its relentless virtual jihad against the Jews, made Christian life insecure as well. There are now 10,000 Christians left in the Holy City. Writing last week in Israel's newspaper *Ha'aretz*, Danny Rubinstein noted that the average age of Palestinian Christians under Arafat's control is 31, while the average age of the general population of the Palestinian territories is 18. This is a demographic death knell. What's more, if intermarriage occurs, the Christian partner must convert to Islam.

The world's Christian clergy wants to stem the abandonment of the Holy Land. And, in this, Israel—which views Christians as less hostile to the Zionist cause—is their ally. But, nonetheless, all the local churches routinely side with the Palestinian Authority against the Israeli government. Nothing good for Christians will come of any of this pandering—nothing.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES once wondered why the Jews and the Arabs couldn't settle their squabbles like "Christian gentlemen." But the Holy Land's Christians are not immune to squabbles of their own. Although they momentarily put aside their differences for the pope's worship at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, they are bitterly divided. John Paul visited the church—the burial place of Jesus and surely the most sacred site in Christendom—twice. But the fourth-century Holy Sepulchre is a study in the theological wars between the Catholics, the Greek Orthodox, and the Armenians. When Pope Paul VI visited it in 1964, priests from different sects actually came to blows. The Third World Copts and Abyssinian Christians, who also claim it as their shrine, are palpably despised by their richer ecclesiastical cousins. In Berlin in 1878, the European powers held an ostensibly successful congress to solve the Holy Sepulchre's ancient conflicts. But it did not. And neither can even this great pope.

John Paul II came to *terra sancta* in the deep dusk of his life. I am not qualified to assay his doctrinal initiatives, although I suspect he is too conservative even for the good of Catholicism on the status of women and the celibacy of the clergy. Still, he won his and his church's struggle against communism. He picked up where John XXIII left off in reconciling the people of the Old Covenant with the peoples of the New Testament. After this trip to Israel, Jewish-Catholic relations will never be the same again.

But this stunning achievement comes also in the dark dusk of Christianity's own immemorial existence in the Holy Land. Palestine's Christian diaspora, like that of the rest of the Middle East, is now scattered from Sydney to Buenos Aires to Detroit—scattered, mostly, by political Islam. The pope's Mass on the Mount of the Beatitudes was peopled not with 100,000 local Christians but with pilgrims who wanted to follow the Holy Father in the footsteps of Jesus. One more reason for this towering man to weep. ■

Campaign Journal

Bushed

By MICHELLE COTTLE

IT IS, I realize, bad form to question a man's stamina. Simply invoking the word in mixed company prompts uncomfortable squirming, dredging up God knows what primal insecurities in the macho mind. But, more and more in recent weeks, it has started to look like candidate stamina may well determine this year's presidential election. So the subject must be broached: Does

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

George W. Bush have what it takes to go all the way?

Forget intellect. It has long been a tenet of this race that Al Gore is much, much smarter than his Republican opponent. Now it turns out the vice president's college grades were as lousy as W.'s. But, even if Gore is smarter, does it really matter? Ronald Reagan taught us you don't have to be brainy to be enshrined as a great president and get a major metropolitan airport named after you. To win the job, however, you must be able to survive a relentless, ever-elongating campaign calendar, spending weeks on end away from home, your every word and deed picked apart by snarling reporters, not to mention opposition researchers whose sole purpose in life is to amass enough unflattering material to convince voters that you are too corrupt, stupid, hypocritical, and mentally unbalanced to serve as county dogcatcher.

To run the presidential gauntlet requires enormous physical and mental endurance, fueled by overweening ambition and just a touch of sadomasochism. Gore has all that. Though not as charismatic as President Clinton and probably not as bright, Gore is just as dogged and ambitious and infinitely more disciplined. It is, in fact, the vice president's willingness to stoically do Whatever It Takes that makes him seem so, well, *icky*.

There is little evidence, however, that Bush has the same drive. He's never had to work that hard—in school, in business, or in politics. He was crowned the GOP presidential front-runner without having to do much of anything. For months, Bush sat on his duff in Austin while the money and endorsements came rolling in—and much of the competition bowed out. The primary trail came as a nasty shock to the governor's system, leaving him sniveling about how much he missed his house, his bed, and his pet cat Ernie. And that was back in January. Now W. is facing a seven-month assault from a competitor known for both his tenacity and his ruthlessness, and Republicans had better hope their boy has more stamina and stick-to-itiveness than his track record suggests.

By now, there have been dozens of books and profiles discussing George W.'s colorful youth, invariably describing an enormously likeable, friendly, fun-loving partyer with practically zero interest in working diligently to achieve any particular goal. (W. was "an aggressive coaster" who, when faced with imminent failure, would exert short bursts of intense effort, his college roommate told *Newsweek* in a February profile.) After coasting through Yale University and a two-year Vietnam-avoiding stint in the Texas Air National Guard, W. went through what he has dubbed his "nomadic years." In classic dilettante fashion, he hopped from job to job, none holding his attention. Many a day was spent carousing and sunning himself poolside, drink in hand, at the swinging-singles apartment complex where he lived in Houston. As *U.S. News & World Report* noted last November, "He often didn't work for months at a time, living off personal savings and family wealth."

In 1973, W. entered Harvard Business School—an experience that his mother, among others, has credited with giving him "structure." But reminiscences about the post-Harvard Bush suggest that he emerged from B-school an enormously likeable, friendly, fun-loving partyer with practically zero interest in working diligently to achieve any particular goal. Come graduation, W. was still looking for direction, and he soon found himself back in his boyhood hometown of Midland, Texas, following Poppy's footsteps into the oil business. Family credentials (and family members themselves) helped W. raise the capital to launch his own drilling company—and later to bail it out during hard times. And he was never one to micromanage or sweat the details. A July article in *The Washington Post* said of W.'s stint in the oil patch: "Bush has acknowledged he drank too much in those days, but people who worked for him say that it didn't keep him from showing up at the office each morning at 8 and staying till 5 p.m. or often later." Wow. A nine-hour workday. Where did he find the energy?

When citing his qualifications to be president, Bush reasonably points to his tenure as governor of Texas. But, whatever lessons the job has imparted, a tough work ethic is not among them. This isn't entirely Bush's fault: the Texas governorship is a famously toothless position that gives the officeholder very little to do. As a friend of Bush's noted in 1994, "The governor's office is more of a cheerleader and a p.r. person ... veto power and making appointments, that's about their duty." What's more, the state legislature meets for only 140 or so days every other year; the rest of the time the governor's office serves primarily as a bully pulpit.

So how did W. fill his days? According to a June profile in *Texas Monthly*: "He has always been a creature of routine.... He gets to his Capitol office by eight in the morning; takes private time from eleven-forty to one-thirty, when he runs three to five miles at the University of Texas track at a pace of seven and a half minutes a mile, and afterward might play a little video golf or computer solitaire until three...." Nor was W. one to burn the midnight oil. In a February article in *The New York Times*, Bush's Texas chief of staff (praising W.'s discipline) noted that the governor typically worked from 8:30 to 5:30. Let's see ... a nine-hour day, encompassing a two-hour exercise break and a couple of hours of video games—hardly seems a grueling prep course for the presidential trail.

This is not to say W. is lazy. He is a famously high-energy guy who will throw himself into his work—so long as he's having fun. Friends say he went all out in his ill-fated congressional race in 1978, knocking on doors up and down the Texas panhandle. "George W. loved life on the trail," a chum recalls in the Bush biography by Elizabeth Mitchell, *W: Revenge of the Bush Dynasty*. "He liked meeting people. He was a sponge, soaking up facts about little geographic areas, about the people who lived there." Likewise, as owner of the Texas Rangers, W. devoted himself to making the team a success. Mitchell writes: "[Bush] spent his workdays on the phones at his cluttered North Dallas office with its simple 'GWB' on the door, arranging tickets for friends ... and taking calls from [his dad in] the Oval Office. Whenever there was a home game, he would slip on his Rangers jacket and drive the half-hour to the stadium at Arlington. He would chat up the ticket takers, greet the ushers by name. Every few feet a fan would wave him down, to give him a bit of advice on a proposed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trade or accept a compliment." Sounds like great fun.

The life of a presidential candidate, however, is often crushingly unfun. Except for the retail politics practiced in Iowa and New Hampshire—of which Bush did much less than his competitors—the process is less about getting to know people than about tarmac photo-ops and mouthing the same boring stump speech over and over again. And that's the easy stuff. Thus far, Team Bush has labored to minimize the candidate's exposure to the more mentally taxing elements of campaigning—answering voter questions (as opposed to just shootin' the bull), enduring media grillings, participating in debates. After his humiliating defeat in New Hampshire, W. briefly began holding McCain-like, unscripted Q&A sessions with voters. But the moment Bush captured South Carolina, his aides canceled the town meetings scheduled for Michigan, allowing the governor to stick with the perfunctory grip-and-grins.

ROB RABBUNI

Reporters note that Bush's campaign schedule tends not to be as strenuous as his competitors'. In March, for instance, Gore spent four more days on the road than W. And even this winter, when Bush was traveling constantly, he often held fewer daily events than John McCain—leaving plenty of downtime for jogging, naps, and quick trips home. In fact, immediately upon learning that he would squash McCain in South Carolina, Bush told top aides that he wanted to take a "power nap."

Despite all this, the governor began to show signs of wear and tear early on. The night of the Iowa caucuses, he allowed a handful of the traveling press on his late-night flight to New Hampshire. "Somewhat surprisingly," reported *The New York Times*, "the 53-year-old candidate returned repeatedly to the subjects of depleted energy, genuine fatigue and the difficulty of being away from home for long stretches while he campaigns." A few days later, Bush told a crowd in Concord: "I love campaigning, but I miss my family. I miss my house. I miss where I live. I miss the routines that I guess I'd taken for granted for a long time. This is the longest stretch of time I've been away from my family." And, at a Lincoln Day Dinner in New Hampshire, the *Houston Chronicle* noted in February, a Bush aide actually asked candidate Gary Bauer to step aside and let W. speak first because the governor was tired. A miffed Bauer refused.

Concerned about the effect such fatigue might have on W.'s campaign performance, I contacted a workplace psychologist, Bruce Cedar, to ask about common symptoms of flagging stamina. "If you really are very fatigued, your concentration isn't going to be as good," explains Cedar, who is based just outside Boston. "Functions such as word retrieval and the ability to pull out the right metaphors" fall by the wayside.

Moreover, warned Cedar, campaigning can wreak havoc on candidates' sleep schedules. And, for someone like W. (a self-described creature of routine who cherishes his beauty rest), this can take a toll. "It becomes difficult to concentrate," says Cedar. "You lose your sense of thinking clearly—that ability to take in information and respond appropriately. Your nerves get a little frayed. You don't have the reserves to really deal with difficulties that can come up. You have a shorter temper." Sure enough, reporters who regularly cover W. confirm that, after several days on the road, the candidate is not only more apt to spew his trademark malapropisms; he also tends to repeat himself during speeches and to get "prickly" and "defensive" during press conferences.

There are some people, like Clinton, who seem to operate fine with a nonstop schedule and virtually no sleep, marvels Cedar. And that obviously gives them an edge on the campaign trail. Then there are folks, like Gore, who are "much better prepared" for the campaign grind because they have trained themselves to work like dogs. "Gore's been driving himself like that all his life," notes Cedar. "You get the impression that George W. is the kind of guy who likes to kick back—work a little bit and play a little."

With the candidates vowing to campaign nonstop till Election Day, W. can pretty much forget about kicking back for at least another seven months. Eventually, he may even be forced to forgo those catnaps and weekends at home and adopt a Gore-like intensity of purpose. Unless maybe, just maybe, he opts for a radically counterintuitive strategy and tries to rally the American people to his cause: taking it easy. After all, the more speeches the candidates give, the more policies they espouse, the more debates they hold, the harder the American public has to work to keep up. And if there's one thing most Americans don't support, it's expending a lot of energy on politics. You can see it now: a Bush pledge not to debate till after baseball season, a vow not to lard the morning papers and evening news with talk of Medicare or the budget surplus. McCain won America's heart by turning citizens on to the political process. Maybe Bush can win it back by telling them what so many already deeply believe: that politics really isn't worth all the fuss after all. ■

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Why Patrick Dorismond didn't have to die.

Excessive Force

By JEFFREY ROSEN

THE NEW YORKERS driven to the brink of riot last week by the shooting of Patrick Dorismond claim that Mayor Rudy Giuliani's zero-tolerance policy against crime has turned their city into a police state. Giuliani's defenders respond, in effect, that you have to take the bitter with the sweet. Yes, the shootings of Dorismond and Amadou Diallo are regrettable; but they are the inevitable side effect of the aggressive policing that has sent crime rates plummeting in New York and around the nation. You can almost hear the implied threat: Stop us from shooting the occasional innocent man, and criminals will rule the streets once more.

This is nonsense. But many white liberals secretly accept it, because they don't understand the difference between two radically different theories of policing that, thanks to Giuliani, are now frequently confused: "broken windows" and "zero tolerance." Broken-windows policing gives cops broad discretion to prosecute or not prosecute low-level offenses in order to deter the social disorder that breeds more serious crime. Zero tolerance focuses not on deterring crime but on *discovering* it—by mandating that police stop, frisk, and arrest vast numbers of young black and Hispanic men for minor offenses, in the hope that turnstile jumpers and pot smokers may also be guilty of more serious offenses. Broken windows has helped reduce crime in cities across the nation. Zero tolerance has undermined the popular support upon which effective crime-fighting ultimately relies.

To understand how broken-windows policing, which the mayor used with some success during his first term, morphed during his second term into its ill-conceived antithesis requires understanding a debate that long predates the Giuliani administration. Indeed, the question of how to constrain police discretion while empowering officers to investigate low-level public disorder has provided much of the drama in constitutional and criminal law over the past 50 years.

For most of American history, the police enjoyed free rein to enforce or not enforce vague vagrancy laws, which protected "health, safety, and morals." The theory behind the nineteenth-century vagrancy laws anticipated the broken-windows policy: "The vagrant has been very appropriately described as the chrysalis of every species of criminal," wrote the author of the definitive nineteenth-century treatise on police power. "If vagrancy could be successfully combated . . . the infractions of the law would be reduced to a surprisingly small number." Accordingly, the 1887 police manual for New York City gave officers broad power to "disperse unlawful or dangerous assemblages, and assemblages which obstruct the free passage of public streets, sidewalks, parks and places." From the late 1880s until the 1950s, more than half the arrests in America's large cities were for drunkenness, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, and suspicious conduct.

This was not zero tolerance. Vagrancy laws were enforced selectively. As Robert Ellickson of Yale Law School has noted, until the '50s, cities like New York operated under the so-called skid-row system, which tolerated far greater levels of public disorder in certain areas than in others. Skid-row neighborhoods, "along with closely related Red Light Districts," Ellickson writes, "were areas where a city relaxed its ordinary standards of street civility." The police tolerated moderate public intoxication, panhandling, and bench-squatting in skid-row neighborhoods but not on Fifth Avenue. This informal zoning system allowed the police to quarantine public disorder in particular districts, like the Bowery, which became a kind of safety valve for the rest of the city.

Public-loitering laws came under constitutional and political fire in the 1960s for the same reason Giuliani's zero-tolerance policy is under attack today: discriminatory enforcement. Because of the laws' vagueness, critics charged, police used them to single out vulnerable groups—especially racial minorities. Some African Americans also complained that, under vagrancy laws, police tolerated higher levels of criminal behavior in poor neighborhoods than in rich ones.

Moved by these concerns, the Supreme Court in the '60s and '70s began striking down public-disorder laws on the grounds that they were too vague. In the landmark 1972 *Papachristou* case, the Supreme Court invalidated a Florida vagrancy ordinance that allowed the police to punish "rogues and vagabonds," "lewd, wanton, and lascivious persons," "common gamblers," "thieves," and "habitual loafers." By creating an "all-inclusive and generalized" list of crimes, including strolling without a lawful purpose, Justice William O. Douglas concluded, the law essentially gave the police a blank check to arrest anyone they pleased. Without standards governing police discretion, Douglas warned, such an ordinance "permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law."

This constitutional revolution had a disastrous effect on law enforcement. As Williams Stuntz of the University of Virginia has noted, once it became harder for foot patrols to remove the disorderly, police retreated into their patrol cars—turning to a more reactive style of policing that increased the likelihood that officers' encounters with citizens would turn violent. Ironically, this transformation occurred at the very moment empirical research began to demonstrate that reactive strategies could not effectively

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

combat crime. In 1982, James Q. Wilson and George Kelling published their celebrated article "Broken Windows" in *The Atlantic Monthly*, which argued that policing lower-level public disorder—loitering, drug use, gang activity, and public drinking—best diminished the fear and social disorder that allowed more serious crime to flourish.

In the '80s and '90s, responding to the new conventional wisdom Wilson and Kelling helped to create, city councils around the country passed new laws prohibiting specific acts of public disorder. By framing the new "quality of life" laws more narrowly than their predecessors, cities avoided the untrammeled discretion that had led courts to invalidate previous legislation. Cities such as New York and San Francisco prohibited loitering for the purposes of engaging in prostitution or selling drugs, or allowed the police to disperse panhandlers lingering within 30 feet of a cash machine. In New York, courts reviewed the public-order laws carefully, balancing the expressive interests of panhandlers and loiterers against the privacy interests of innocent citizens. They upheld laws prohibiting begging in the subway—an enclosed space where passengers may feel especially threatened or invaded—but struck down laws prohibiting begging on street corners. They struck down legislation prohibiting loitering in subways but upheld laws prohibiting loitering in front of schools.

This, too, was not zero tolerance. If the new laws prohibiting minor quality-of-life offenses—from jaywalking to drinking in public—had truly been enforced without exception, most New Yorkers would be in jail. The broken-windows approach instead urged cities to use quality-of-life offenses to *increase* police discretion, not to eliminate it. "'Zero tolerance' is a phrase I never use, never have used," Kelling declared at a recent conference sponsored by the School of Criminal Justice at the State University of New York at Albany. "It is antithetical to what I'm talking about." On the contrary, by allowing police to choose among a wide variety of legal and nonlegal sanctions for public disorders—from informal warnings to formal citations—the broken-windows policy viewed arrest as a last rather than as a first resort. As Kelling has written, "Neighborhood rules were to be enforced for the most part through non-arrest approaches ... so that arrest would only be resorted to when other approaches failed."

In this spirit, the Koch and Dinkins administrations in the '80s began to combine aggressive order maintenance with police discretion. They tried, for instance, to rezone the homeless. In a fascinating new book called *Sidewalk*, Mitchell Duneier, a sociologist at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, describes the decade-long effort to control the hundreds of homeless people who took up residence in and around New York's Pennsylvania Station after the decline of single-room-occupancy hotels in the early '80s. When Amtrak prohibited sleeping in the terminal, the homeless moved downtown to Sixth Avenue in Greenwich Village, where homeless alcoholics had long worked as street vendors. The police responded by cracking down on street vending. But a 1982 amendment to New York's vending law—proposed by a liberal city council member who wanted to protect a homeless poet—said the general prohibition on street vending didn't apply to those who used tables to sell newspapers, periodicals, or books. Accordingly, between 1985 and 1993, hundreds of homeless refugees from Penn Station reinvented themselves as vendors of recycled newspapers and used magazines. In 1993, the city council closed the loophole and imposed strict zoning restrictions on newspaper vendors. By



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reducing the number of spots available for homeless people to sell newspapers, the new law forced the homeless to squat to preserve their spaces. In other words, New York wasn't showing zero tolerance for public disorder; it was trying merely to contain it, much like the old skid-row system did.

New York applied the broken-windows approach in other ways as well. Working with Kelling, William Bratton, David Dinkins's transit-police chief, cracked down in 1990 on low-level disorder in the subways, such as turnstile-jumping. Subway felonies dropped 75 percent, and robberies dropped 64 percent. And, in his first years in office, Giuliani picked up where Dinkins had left off. When Giuliani made Bratton police commissioner in 1994, Bratton brought his approach to the entire force. Between 1990 and 1997, misdemeanor arrests increased by more than 80 percent. And the initial reviews were positive, even in minority communities. In a *New York Times* poll conducted in 1997, at the end of Giuliani's first term, 44 percent of African Americans said the NYPD was doing a good or excellent job.

BUT, LATE IN Giuliani's first term, the broken-windows approach morphed into zero tolerance, and a crucial opportunity to win minority support evaporated. Although the precise moment of transformation is hard to pin down, it occurred on the watch of Bratton, whose 1998 book, *Turnaround*, proclaims allegiance to broken windows while in fact endorsing a less flexible approach.

As Bratton describes it, his views changed when he realized that the crackdown in the subway wasn't merely deterring crime by preventing the corrosive effects of low-level disorder. It also had the unintended effect of catching serious criminals. In the course of arresting turnstile jumpers, officers discovered many who were wanted for more dangerous offenses: one in seven fare beaters had arrest warrants outstanding, Bratton notes. "We hadn't thought of it," Bratton writes, "but it stands to reason that someone coming into the system with the intention to commit a crime is not likely to pay for the privilege." Eventually, the police began seeing the arrests of fare beaters as a tool of criminal investigation rather than an end in themselves.

The public event that crystallized the shift from broken windows to zero tolerance was the arrest in June 1996 of John Royster, who was accused of brutally beating three women near Central Park. The police caught Royster when fingerprints they had taken after arresting him for jumping a subway turnstile matched those found at the scene of the crime. "If you pay attention to minor crimes, clearly you end up with people involved in the major crimes," declared Howard Safir, Giuliani's second police commissioner, who took over in April of that year. This was a subtle but critical shift. Instead of prosecuting lower-level offenses to encourage an atmosphere of social order that would *prevent* more serious crime, Giuliani, Bratton, and Safir began prosecuting lower-level offenses in order to *catch* more serious criminals. Stopping and frisking numerous ordinary citizens, they reasoned, would make the people carrying illegal guns fear that their weapons would be discovered during an arrest for a more minor offense. And this would deter them from carrying guns in the first place.

It was this approach that led to undercover operations like Operation Condor, under which officers shot Patrick Dorismond in the course of approaching him to buy marijuana he didn't possess, and to the formation of the infamous Street Crimes Unit, which shot the unarmed Amadou Diallo. Under Operation Condor, narcotics officers volunteered to work overtime to arrest people for minor crimes, such as smoking marijuana and trespassing. Between 1999 and 2000, narcotics-division arrests for misdemeanors increased by 68 percent. As *The New York Times* noted last week, Operation Condor has driven drug-trafficking indoors, but it has had little impact on the homicide rate, which actually increased, or on the rate of narcotic-felony arrests, which decreased by nine percent. Instead, according to the *Times*, 75 percent of Operation Condor's arrests have been for misdemeanors or even more trivial crimes. In other words, the zero-tolerance thesis—that turnstile jumpers would turn out, under investigation, to be carrying illegal guns—proved, after a certain point, to be wrong: many pot smokers were guilty of nothing more than smoking pot. In an effort to keep its statistics up, the narcotics unit found itself arresting and prosecuting scores of low-level offenders. These were precisely the people who, under the broken-windows approach, might have been given a warning rather a handcuff. Likewise, the Street Crimes Unit, applying zero-tolerance policies, conducted 45,000 street searches between 1997 and 1998, leading to 10,000 arrests. Once the police began thinking of low-level public disorder not as a problem to be addressed but as an opportunity to investigate more serious crimes, the incentive to arrest citizens for relatively minor offenses dramatically increased.

ZERO TOLERANCE WAS made possible by, and took advantage of, changes in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which regulates searches and seizures. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the police could arrest citizens without a warrant only for serious crimes, such as felonies, or for misdemeanors committed in an officer's presence that threatened a "breach of the peace." But, in the '80s and '90s, the Supreme Court concluded that even harmless and nonviolent traffic offenses could justify a warrantless arrest. (The Court has never explicitly resolved whether the Constitution allows arrest for infractions so trivial that they are ordinarily punished by fine rather than imprisonment.) And, once a citizen is arrested, the police may conduct a full-blown search of his person and property. Moreover, the Court held in 1996 that the police may stop citizens on a pretext—using an arrest for a minor offense as an excuse for investigating a more serious one. Instead of counseling discretion in the face of this vast expansion of police license, zero tolerance recklessly encouraged the police to test its outer limits, greatly increasing the possibility of hostile confrontations and misunderstandings that, in the Diallo and Dorismond cases, proved fatal.

And zero tolerance has not only increased the risk of accidental violence; it has proved discriminatory at its core. For, in an age of limited resources and rampant criminalization, the promise of zero tolerance is, by definition, a lie. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

police cannot possibly prosecute all minor offenders with equal force: New York's jails are not large enough to put all the pot smokers behind bars. In his more candid moments, Safir has acknowledged this. Zero tolerance is a "concept," not a rule, he told a 1999 seminar conducted by Columbia Law School Professor Debra Livingston, one of the leading scholars of order-maintenance policing. In Safir's opinion, zero tolerance of quality-of-life offenses in New York means "not total tolerance." But "not total tolerance" means the police must inevitably exercise discretion about where to focus their limited resources. And discretion raises the following objection: Why should pot smokers in the Bronx be arrested under zero tolerance, while pot smokers in the wealthy neighborhoods of Manhattan light up without fear of police interference?

By promising more than it can deliver, zero tolerance inevitably prompts charges of selective enforcement and discrimination. When Giuliani proposed last November that sleeping homeless people be arrested or issued summonses if they refuse an offer of shelter and a police officer's order to move along, the reaction was hyperbolic. Hillary Clinton said Giuliani's proposal violated the spirit of Christmas, which celebrates "the birth of a homeless child"; she also declared that "criminalizing the homeless with mass arrests for those whose only offense is that they have no home is wrong." In fact, Giuliani's proposal is legally uncontroversial. Most courts have held that cities can prohibit overnight sleeping in parks not designated for camping. (The last celebrated public-sleeping case in New York occurred in 1987, when the New York State Supreme Court sustained the involuntary hospitalization of Billy Boggs, a homeless woman who lived on a sidewalk in front of a Manhattan restaurant.) Instead of trying to rezone the homeless, like David Dinkins and Ed Koch, Giuliani threatened mass arrests of homeless people and then proceeded to arrest very few.

WILLIAM STUNTZ HAS argued that order-maintenance policing inevitably discriminates against minorities, because minorities are disproportionately poor and spend more of their time on the street. They have fewer private places into which they can retreat to conceal their minor crimes than the rich, and therefore they are more likely to be the targets of the police, who need far more evidence to investigate offenses committed in private than in public. One way of alleviating this discrimination, Stuntz suggests, would be to adopt a genuinely zero-tolerance approach—targeted at the rich as well as at the poor—using search warrants and high-tech investigations to surprise rich white drug users in their Manhattan apartments and suburban country homes instead of focusing exclusively on open-air drug markets in Brooklyn, Harlem, and the Bronx. Such a strategy would provoke the same demonstrations on Park Avenue that it inspired last week on Flatbush Avenue—which is why it will never happen. Alternatively, if Giuliani were serious about zero tolerance, he could arrest Wall Street brokers who smoke pot in Battery Park and use the search as an excuse to look for evidence of Securities and Exchange Commission violations in their briefcases.

From the perspective of justice and equality, Stuntz's proposal makes perfect sense. But it wouldn't do much to reduce serious crime, which is what order maintenance was supposed to be about in the first place. A better solution would be to abandon the tendentious and misleading rhetoric of zero tolerance—except in neighborhoods where it enjoys political support. In a little-noticed but highly successful experiment early last year, the Thirty-third Precinct designated West 163rd Street in Washington Heights as a "model block." Before increasing their presence, the police held a community meeting explaining their strategy for getting rid of drug dealers; they then set up barricades on both ends of the block, checked the IDs of all passersby, and investigated even the most minor infractions. Once the benefits of the effort had become obvious—crime dropped by 20 percent—residents practically begged the police not to take the roadblocks down.

THE WASHINGTON HEIGHTS experiment confirms what cities that have successfully applied the broken-windows strategy have long known: In order maintenance, the politics of law enforcement are just as important as the sociology of law enforcement. "Order-maintenance policing works for crime control, but it creates a huge need for cities to improve the quality of political participation," says Dan Kahan of Yale Law School. "It's a drug whose primary effect is that it will reduce crime, and its side effect is that it may exacerbate political tensions."

In Boston, the police department reached out to gang members and ministers from black churches to build community support for aggressive strategies to reduce gun violence. In Chicago, the city council passed an anti-gang loitering law, with key support from the city's black neighborhoods. And, after the Supreme Court struck it down in 1999 on the grounds that it gave the police too much discretion to arrest known gang members loitering "without an apparent purpose," the council passed a more focused version of the same law. "The only way to make order-maintenance policing a lasting presence is to make sure that the people affected have a role in the process, so they don't feel that they're being controlled by an occupying army," says Kahan. By refusing to address the political side effects of aggressive policing and willfully exacerbating them with his inflammatory rhetoric, Giuliani has sealed his own failure.

If Giuliani's zero-tolerance fiasco teaches anything, it is that the dream of removing prosecutorial discretion, which is to say politics, from law enforcement is the surest way of subverting the public support on which successful prosecutions rely. Like the backlash against Kenneth Starr's investigation of President Clinton—another failed effort based on zero tolerance of relatively minor offenses—last week's backlash against Giuliani reminds us that effective law enforcement officials must seek the political support of the communities they serve. By contemptuously ignoring this basic lesson, Giuliani has not only imperiled his hard-earned legacy as an effective fighter of crime. He has also raised questions about whether he is temperamentally suited to hold elective office. ■

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Stanley Kauffmann on Films

Other Worlds

TWO WEEKS AGO, reviewing *Wonder Boys*, which has Frances McDormand in its cast, I noted that a year earlier I had seen her in an Off-Broadway production of a new play on the Oedipus theme by Dare Clubb and thus I saw her film performance against the background of her work in that demanding four-hour play. Now comes **Waking the Dead** (USA), starring Billy Crudup, who was the Oedipus in that production. As with McDormand, his stage performance, carefully designed and sensitively colored, was, for me, the background of his screen role.

The first benefit of my theater memory was patience: Crudup is not a cannonading film personality like Brando or Depardieu or Mastroianni who rides roughshod over any hesitation. We must let him work on us, assuming that the screenplay gives him the chance; and with his Oedipus in mind, it was easy to let expectation simmer. And rewarding. Crudup's previous films, *The Hi-Lo Country* and *Without Limits*, afforded him little more than the chance to be adequate. What I remember chiefly from those films is the fine modeling of his face, features that suggested some depth in him. In this new screenplay by Robert Dillon (from Scott Spencer's novel), Crudup, as he had done in Clubb's complex play, moves into those depths.

He plays a young man, Fielding, at several times in his life, 1972, 1974, and 1982—not in sequence but interwoven. Unbraided, it is the story of Fielding's love for Sarah, a political activist who reciprocates but who thinks him insufficiently concerned with her causes, or at least with the way she addresses them. At the very start Fielding sees a TV newscast announcing that Sarah has been killed by a car bomb while she was chauffeuring two Chilean dissidents who were the bomb's real targets. The film then flashes back to the Fielding-Sarah relationship in the past, how it began and grew. Along with this and equally important is the progress of Fielding's own career. He attends law school, gets a post in the Chicago prosecutor's office, then runs for Congress and wins.

But his career and even his love affair are only the scaffolding for the story's real theme, which is mystic. After Sarah is killed, Fielding thinks he sees her here and there, and near the end he has a long scene in his Washington office in which Sarah comes—or does not come—to him. It seems quite real, but the film ends with a doubt about whether it actually happened.The main work for Crudup in this script, for all its personal opportunities, is to make it credible. He gets little help from Jennifer Connelly, an actress of small appeal and minimal talent, who plays Sarah. Through his response to her, Crudup has to endow her with qualities that she herself ought to be supplying. And he has also to provide some rationale—odd though that word may be—for the film's mystic elements.

Crudup can help only so much, and does as far as possible. But what he cannot do is supply a point for the picture. It's missing. What is the whole twisty tale about? Much of the dialogue plods through familiar arguments for and against activism, but it is hard to see how the appearance of this revenant, if Sarah really is one and really does appear, settles the disagreements between them. Are we meant to infer that the afterlife has enlisted in the earth's struggles for social justice? Or what?

The picture wouldn't even get to the point where those questions can be asked if it weren't for Crudup. With his performance, he decrees that the mystic elements disturbingly exist: his Fielding either believes that Sarah was not killed and comes out of hiding occasionally or that she is dead and is visiting from the other side. But Crudup gives us much more than credibility. Throughout the picture he lives in that lovely mixed realm of acting and non-acting that only good actors can enter, that sense of truth being made before our eyes by a skilled maker.

His key moment is a skillfully arranged scene, almost a set-piece. Fielding is at a dinner table with his family after he wins the election. He bursts into a long speech—prompted by the confusions that Sarah's visitations have caused although he doesn't mention them. He announces that he will not accept his election, will not proceed into Congress. His family is stunned into silence. He pauses a moment, several moments, then smiles and says, in effect, that now he has gotten all that off his chest, he is settled and will go to Washington. The scene has the lineaments of a grand aria, and Crudup brings it off triumphantly. For me, furnished with the Oedipus memory, his treatment of the scene was the quintessence of a screen performance being blessed by theater experience. It made me eager for more Crudup.

Less eagerness, however, for the director, Keith Gordon. His previous films, *A Midnight Clear* and *Mother Night*, seemed like Hallmark Theater productions for holiday TV. His directing here is less studied than before, but his choice of subject is right from the same Hallmark carton.

Soft Fruit (Fox Searchlight), from Australia, is yet another certificate of membership in a relatively new global freemasonry. Dozens of films from various countries have opened up the lives of lower middle-class families while the last millennium waned and the new one began. Here is one more. With only a few changes, none of them basic, *Soft Fruit* could stand in for one of those previous pictures or vice versa. There is no question of the sincerity of the makers or their accuracy; there is some question, however, about the need for another picture of this kind—for a while, anyway.

This Australian family nests in a suburban house. There are three daughters, all overweight: one of them lives here and the two others have come home because Mom is terminally ill. They have a brother, a shiftless, somewhat violent druggie who doesn't get on with his equally violent father, but the brother appears because he is devoted to Mom and she is in trouble. Family quarrels, frustrations, affections, secrets, daydreams—Jackie O. is Mom's goddess—all make their due appearance, in what has come to seem an international rite.

The best of the cast is Jeanie Drynan, as Mom, so engaging that we can hardly believe she is the mother of this brood. The writer and director was Christine Andreef, whose debut film this is and who can be complimented primarily on her courage in entering so jammed a genre.

In 1915 the poet Vachel Lindsay published *The Art of the Moving Picture*, the first important American book on the subject. Francis Hackett reviewed it in this journal, calling it "a joyous and wonderful performance ... a bold and brilliant theory,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

really bold and really brilliant." A revised edition appeared in 1922, and that edition was republished by Liveright in 1970. Now the Modern Library has published it yet again (paperbound, 201 pp., $14.95) as one of a series of film books edited by Martin Scorsese. For this latest edition, Kent Jones has provided an informative appendix about the pictures that Lindsay mentions. Also, suppressing my modesty for a moment, I note that the introduction I wrote for the 1970 edition is included in the new paperback. For anyone interested in films, this book is a treasure. ■

The ups and downs of repetition.

Broken Glass

By JOHN ROCKWELL

PHILIP GLASS'S RECENT music not only seems tired; it *is* tired. His early innovations are largely unrecognized or forgotten, and premieres of his new works—and they keep on coming—are no longer anticipated with excitement, or even with hostility. They are ignored, except by the general public, which still sort of likes his music, and by professional beat critics, who routinely dismiss the new works as inherently simplistic or, less often, as tedious recyclings of earlier tricks. Some writers, denying their own early opposition to Glass, profess that he has fallen off from his more creative youth; others, more honestly, never saw much there to start with, apart from nagging arpeggios and mind-numbing repetition, which is all that they still see. But in truth it is Glass who has changed, not the critics. His music, outwardly similar to what came before, has declined in quality, and that decline can be described.

I, too, once found much to admire in Glass's music, and in his salutary position in a musical culture that still prized hermetic modernism. Twenty years ago, the polemics between the modernists and the postmodernists, between the uptowners and the downtowners, were at their height. Glass's music, inspired by John Cage's manifestos of liberation and by the spiritual exercises of Asian meditation, was a stirring circumvention of the dense dissonance of mainstream contemporary music, a blast of fresh air into a musty artistic temple. His music proclaimed that complexity was not the same thing as excellence, and that an ornate, virtuosic mastery of technical craft, in composition as well as in performance, would inevitably provoke a retort. Glass's success, far from a sellout to commercialism, was a reconnection of the serious artist to the broader public that had recoiled from the further reaches of modernist abstruseness.

Yet memories of his past glories do little to explain his present failings. A recent run of performances of Glass's opera *Akhnaten* at the Boston Lyric Opera, in a coproduction with the Chicago Opera Theater, offered a welcome occasion for assessing Glass's development. A live confrontation with this work, in a vivid production from the Chicago director Mary Zimmermann, provided a tangible test of one's loss of pleasure in Glass's work. Is this declining interest in Glass's music the result of changes in his style? Or is it, rather, a listener's exhaustion with his trademark musical devices? Would even *Akhnaten*, an opera that was exciting and moving at its Stuttgart premiere 16 years ago, now seem tepid and trite?

From the very first notes, a rapid arpeggiation of the tonic A minor chord, A-C-E-A, by a dark string ensemble (no violins) and with a pedal A intoned in the lower depths, I found myself drawn back into Glass's soundworld, and into his contemplative vision of an eerily exotic, societally detached, theologically visionary monarch. Those opening notes, with their modal and polytonal implications and their brooding atmosphere, still mean more to me than all manner of more recent Glass scores that might on the surface be similarly analyzed. What, then, had changed since his nearly unbroken string of musical triumphs from the mid-'60s to the early '80s?

Glass is still considered the archetypal "minimalist," with all the baggage that poor little word has accrued. Never mind that he was preceded in this manner by painters and dancers and by John Cage and Morton Feldman and Alvin Lucier and LaMonte Young and Terry Riley and—maybe by a minute or two, but who but them is counting—by Steve Reich. And never mind that none of these composers was comfortable with the term. Glass likes to assert that if he ever was a minimalist, he stopped being one in 1974. But a minimalist he is and will always be, in the perception of the public and also in stylistic signature, no matter how grand and bloated his scores become.

TWENTY YEARS AGO, Glass preferred to be called a composer of "music with repetitive structures." It was an accurate description, and it is, for better or worse, what he remains. His earliest music, for solo electric keyboard, sounded both repetitive and minimalist: to the pared-down minimalist aesthetic of offering the most rudimentary forms (of visual elements, of dance gestures, of musical notes) and trusting in their power to carry the work, Glass (and Riley and Reich) added a motor energy that turned stark repetition into a formidable aesthetic idea and a high-energy ritual.

By the late '60s, Glass had evolved his ensemble instrumentation into two or three electric organs and pianos or, later, synthesizers; two or three winds, and a wordless soprano. Heavily amplified, like a rock band, the musicians could make a sound to match any orchestra for sheer volume, and hence could combine the impact of a large ensemble with the devoted executional accuracy of a small ensemble. The music composed for this ensemble, from the late '60s to the late '70s, was always evolving. Glass considers 1974 a significant date, because in the conclusion of *Music in Twelve Parts*, and especially in the root-movement harmonic extensions of Parts Eleven and Twelve, he had consolidated the idiom that—with sometimes interesting, often cosmetic refinements—has served him to this day.

Each step seemed logical after the ones that had preceded it, yet none seemed like a compromise of aesthetic principle. And the aesthetic principle was, I think, essentially meditative. Glass is a Tibetan Buddhist, and his music sets up a mood that hypnotically seduces one into contemplation. (The metaphor of seduction is not accidental, either in its blending of the sacred with the sexual or in its evocation of all those, from Plato to the post-Wagnerian Nietzsche to modern-day conservatives, who fear the seductive power of a non-rational art.) And this idiom was strangely open-ended, emotionally flexi-

JOHN ROCKWELL is the author of *All-American Music* (Da Capo Press) and the editor of the Arts and Leisure section of *The New York Times*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ble: it remained meditative whether the music was fast or slow.

Glass's two basic styles are fleet and burbling, with the electric keyboards of the ensemble shimmering with a silvery energy as the arpeggiated figures and pungent polytonalities fly by; and slow and stately, which is maybe best understood as the isolation of the mournful pedal tones in the winds and brass that sound beneath the mad burbling. The fast style resonates especially in the early work, in *Two Pages*, *Contrary Motion*, *Music in Fifths*, and *Music in Similar Motion*, music from 1968 to 1974, the earliest now available in recorded form.

But surely the definitive articulation of Glass's manner appeared in the music that he composed in 1976 for *Einstein on the Beach*, his first collaboration with Robert Wilson, a work so central to the Glass oeuvre that he recorded it twice. (The later version, the only one now in print, on Nonesuch, is more complete and more confidently executed, the historical charms of the first version notwithstanding.) Both aspects of his early music are amply displayed in *Einstein*. The fast style predominates in the frantic, driving dances and the frenzied violin solos. The slow style (which for Glass connoisseurs remains the mystic center of his music) can be heard in the opening A-G-C descending chord on the organ, and in the gravely dignified, dreamy Trial scenes, and in the eerie Bed scene (in which for fifteen minutes "nothing" happens except that a bed, which is really a fluorescent-lit horizontal band of light, is raised to a vertical position and then drawn very, very slowly up into the fly-space of the theater), and in the flowing, elegiac final "Knee-play," which is what Wilson calls his interludes.

PEOPLE WHO HATED this stuff all along still hear in it only an irreducibly simplistic reiteration of arpeggios, the separated-out notes of the basic chords in the Western harmonic vocabulary. Donal Henahan, a former chief music critic of *The New York Times*, could never write about Glass without mentioning Czerny. But those drawn to the music hear the rapture of ecstatic repetition varied by subtle shifts of note values and rhythmic emphases in the fast sections, and the profundity of the elemental in the slow sections. Floating over all of Glass's music is a veil of sadness, of regret at being bound to this earth, of yearning for the ineffable. For all its obsession with regularity in its structure, this music is brazenly Romantic. It appeals to a joy that transcends rational codification (despite the learned technical analysis with which Glass can explain his methods). It is, indeed, a great musical monument to the pre-rational or the post-rational, and hence it is anathema to the impatient rationalists and the avatars of common sense who figure prominently among the makers of our intellectual and critical discourse.

The spiritual underpinnings of Glass's music are reinforced by his reliance on old church modes, meaning variations of the basic major and minor scales by white-note-only octave sequences built up from each of the white notes on the piano, thus altering the pattern of whole tones and half tones, which can then be transposed, in the equal tempered system, to other root notes. Two of my favorite moments in what might be called late early Glass, just before his music began to sink, are the conclusions of his first "real" opera (meaning a stage work composed for operatic voices and an orchestra), *Satyagraha*, from 1979, and of his score to Godfrey Reggio's film *Koyaanisqatsi*, from 1981. Both are in variants of the Phrygian mode, the former consisting of the tenor Gandhi chanting the scale in its purest form (E to E) upwards in ten groups of three, over and over, as he ascends to grace, and the latter a descending octave scale with a chordal arpeggio in the treble and and an overlay of a Hopi chorus as the screen depicts slowed-down NASA footage of a dreamily turning, burning fragment of an exploded Saturn rocket as its falls inexorably back to earth—Reggio's final metaphor for the futility of technological progress.

Akhnaten was the last and the most complicated artifact of Glass's early music. Its opening captured in orchestral form the arpeggiated basis of the ensemble style (itself an instrumentation of those figures that lay easily under the composer's hand at the keyboard). The prevalent mood throughout the opera is a pining regret for something ancient and, for us, unreachable. And yet many of the hallmarks of Glass's music in the '80s and '90s can be heard here, too, sometimes disadvantageously: in particular, there is his habit—he still hasn't shaken it—of pounding out basic chordal figures in the brass, bluntly and crudely. (Just as *Akhnaten* did without violins, *Satyagraha* has done quite well without brass.) Yet *Akhnaten* also offered pungent percussion, piquant instrumental touches, and fascinating timbral experiments with the vocal writing. (The pharaoh has a mother, a wife, and six daughters, and Glass makes him a countertenor, with several keening, all-high-voice ensembles and the conventional male singing confined to the villains.) Its apogee appears in Akhnaten's hymn to his new sun god, with its polytonally-clashing descending solo trumpet line, E-D-C-B, which sticks in the mind like the very best kind of pop hook.

WHAT HAPPENED THEREafter? Well, to be precise, it wasn't quite such a clean break in 1983. One of the most noteworthy moments in Glass's musical career came, or should have come, on March 23 and 24, 1984. Few composers, and certainly few American composers, have had back-to-back premieres of major operas in major European opera houses. March 23 was the scheduled premiere by the Rome Opera of the evening-long, self-contained fifth act of Wilson's mammoth *Civil Wars* (a project intended for its day-long completion at the 1984 Olympic Arts Festival in Los Angeles, but never realized); but a wickedly typical Italian strike forced the transformation of the "premiere" into a private dress rehearsal for the assembled army of journalists. The official premiere came several days later. Then, on March 24, there was the premiere of *Akhnaten* in Stuttgart.

The fifth act of *Civil Wars* has recently been released on Nonesuch. Composed at nearly the same time as *Akhnaten*, it provokes a fascinating and discouraging comparison. The main interest of the new recording is the eloquent voice-overs by Wilson and Laurie Anderson. The vocal writing is stentorian—Jessye Norman was supposed to sing in Los Angeles—but unevocative, and the instrumental writing alternates between the bluntly hectoring (as in the music for the Italian tenor who plays Garibaldi) and the self-effacingly formulaic echoes from his earlier work, which called more attention to themselves than to whatever it was Glass was trying to convey.

Since then, little of his music has seized one's attention with quite the same degree of intensity or enthusiasm. What seems to have changed most profoundly is the composer's own faith, or interest, in his great aesthetic experiment in unadorned, protracted repetition. The repeated materials have become too plain; the periodization of the repeats—how often and how long they are repeated—seems now too restless, too willing to accommodate conventional taste; and the variations to which the material is subjected sound likewise more simplistic than involving. Glass once defied his audience to be bored. Now he panders nervously to his audience in the fear they may be bored. And his pandering undercuts the radical, hypnotic aura of his early music.

The expansion of Glass's ambitions into orchestral music compounded the problem. It is true that he was deluged by commissions occasioned by his earlier successes; but the industry that was suddenly required of him seems to have taken

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a toll on his powers and his standards. The need to write for busy bands of professional musicians, with little rehearsal time and an often ingrained resistance to trying anything new, may have encouraged a simplification of the tricky variations of his ensemble repetitive style. Even when working with smaller groups, Glass's musicians are now often professional freelancers rather than (or in addition to) his core ensemble, and his expansion into popular and ethnic music and film scorsing has likewise encouraged a devolution of his music into smaller atmospheric chunks closer in length to pop singles.

This is not say that Glass has become complacent. He is still broadening his harmonic language, extending his instrumental combinations, and exploring new ways of recording. (The overdubbing of separate orchestral and vocal elements in the 1985 recording of *Satyagraha* was an early example of his technological restlessness.) He has also undertaken new kinds of collaborations, in particular his trilogy of music for or inspired by classic French films. All this is evidence of an active musical imagination. The problem lies in the quality of all this activity.

His two orchestral reformulations of the music of David Bowie and Brian Eno, the *Low* Symphony and the *Heroes* Symphony, are interesting as ideas, reaching out to the music of two of the most inventive figures of British art-rock, but the symphonies combine the worst of both worlds, reducing the distinctiveness of their pop models into old-fashioned-sounding orchestral gestures. Nearly all of Glass's music from the '80s and '90s sounds similarly second-rate, from the unrecorded operas and film scores such as *The Voyage*, *The Making of the Representative for Planet 8* and *Monsters of Grace*, to dance works such as *In the Upper Room* (1986), to orchestral works such as the *Symphony no. 2* and the *Violin Concerto*, to *Itaipu* and *The Canyon* (two grandiose scores for chorus and ethnically flavored orchestra and orchestra, respectively) and even most of the more recent string quartets, to the overt world-music experiments and scrappy underscoring such as the Reggio *Powaqqatsi* and the film scores for *Anima Mundi*, *Mishima*, *Screens*, *The Thin Blue Line*, *Kundun*, *Monsters of Grace* and the Bela Lugosi *Dracula*, to the unself-conscious reductions of his own style in *Glassworks* (which preceded 1983; these demarcations are not exact) and the popsy *Songs from Liquid Days*, to the scenically brilliant, musically undernourished David Henry Hwang and Allen Ginsberg settings of *1000 Airplanes on the Roof* and *Hydrogen Jukebox*. Precious little of all this stands up.

Philip Glass by Vint Lawrence for The New Republic

The trouble with Glass's recent formal and coloristic innovations is that they have not been accompanied by a coherent and still convincing expansion of his idiom. A repetitive music based on pure repetition has become a compromised, crude reduction. In attempting to expand his harmonic idiom and to increase the responsiveness of his music to texts in familiar modern languages, he has approached neo-Romantic conventionality and demagoguery in a way that both exposes the weaknesses of his style to accomplish those ends and subverts the stark abstraction of that style. What once was meditatively stimulating has become truly primitive.

Consider two orchestral works, the *Violin Concerto* (1987) and the *Symphony no. 2* (1994). Both were born in prestigious circumstances—commissioned by Dennis Russell Davies, for the American Composers Orchestra and the Brooklyn Philharmonic, respectively—and both have enjoyed authoritative recordings, the concerto with Gidon Kremer as soloist and Christoph von Dohnanyi conducting the Vienna Philharmonic, and the symphony with Davies conducting the Vienna Radio Symphony. Yet both reveal similar failings.

The very opening of the concerto is dispiriting. Its first thirty seconds offers only a recycling of overfamiliar devices, compressed into too short a time frame to allow them to register: phases repeated and then bluntly juxtaposed with other material, a low pedal note and then, too quickly, the entrance of the solo violinist, arpeggiating as if his life depended on it. Similarly, one minute and fifteen seconds into the third movement (I take the timing from the compact disc) comes one of Glass's patented bass figures, intoned by the brass, A-A-A-A-B-flat-B-flat-A-G, with the final A implied, which recurs throughout the movement, louder and louder, blunter and blunter. The best thing about this concerto is the solo violin writing, and Kremer plays beautifully, especially in the haunting slow movement. But Kremer has also recorded John Adams's Violin Concerto, a far more imaginative score that makes Glass's look stale. And the Second Symphony is likewise constructed of crushingly familiar devices: a short-breathed tune that snakes through the first movement without compelling variation; syncopated figures in the second; a choppy, hiccupy alternation of melodic and rhythmic material in the third, particularly one of Glass's core patterns, da-da, da-DA-da, hammering itself into a listener's brain.

Struggling and stumbling along the path of career growth is hardly unique to Glass. Artists who enjoy an early suc-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cess face the dilemma of altering their style at the risk of alienating their early fans, or maintaining it and losing creative momentum. Glass, having invented a language, chooses not to abandon its basic grammar. He seems to have no faith that his own compositional personality will shine through any idiom in which he chooses to work. Stravinsky constantly reinvented himself; Copland's sweet personality and bedrock Americanism shine through even his twelve-tone scores; Adams, starting as a Reichian, has pushed his idiom in both the American-symphonic and pop-pastiche directions. But Glass is stuck in his Glassisms. "Style is a very dangerous concept," the architect Renzo Piano warned recently. "It's a narcissistic attitude. Style is like a rubber stamp, a designer label; it becomes quite commercial."

GLASS HAS LONG asserted that he is a born dramatist, but I am not sure that he is right. True, he wrote yards of incidental music early on for the theater troupe Mabou Mines. But his best works for the stage have been occult rituals in languages (Urdu, Hindu, ancient Egyptian, Sanskrit, even the numbers and solfège syllables of *Einstein*) that mean nothing to contemporary audiences. The mood was heightened by exotic incomprehension, and in his case, the clarity afforded by supertitles did him a disservice. Setting understandable modern languages in a more conventional way exposes the rigid limitations of his self-imposed, doggedly sustained style; his text settings, unless he falls back on the device of spoken narration over music, sound clunky. He is not a narrator of any skill; he is, rather, a painter of moods, and for this reason his music works better with images (films, stage spectacles) than with texts, and maybe better still as concert music.

It is no accident that two of his most striking works of the '90s are the String Quartet no. 4 (1990) and the Piano Études, which are unrecorded, with more études apparently still coming. The "Buczak" Quartet, as no. 4 is titled in memory of a friend who died of AIDS, has the meditative grief of his best works of the past. (It may be heard on the Kronos Quartet's recording of four of his string quartets, also on Nonesuch.) And the Piano Études, far more complex and interesting than the simplistic compositions assembled on the CBS CD from 1989 called *Solo Piano*, represent what may be a genuinely new direction for Glass. They retain most of his signature stylistic elements; and yet they manage, without descending into pastiche, to summon all manner of ghosts of keyboards past: one hears visitations by Bach (whose spirit is also lovingly evoked in the late Donald Joyce's stirring Point CD of Glass music played on the pipe organ), Chopin, Debussy, Ravel, and Bartok.

At the height of the modernist/postmodernist, uptown/downtown musical polemics of the '70s and '80s, modernists dismissed Glass as a mere populist; but that was never correct, even when he (and Reich) courted rock audiences during the punk-progressive moment in the late '70s. At this discouraging moment in our musical culture, when we are awash in cheap, demagogic, faceless neo-Romanticism, we can look back on the older polemics from a new perspective. Obviously there were airheads downtown and pedants uptown (or vice versa), but the best in both neighborhoods were genuine experimentalists, and in that sense they were modernists, pushing the language and the expressive power of music into new realms, breathing the air of new planets.

Glass, the early Glass especially, was just such an experimenter. His achievement of those years is likely to endure when the airheads and the pedants have long faded from memory. Of course, there were those who complained at every step along the way—especially after *Music in Twelve Parts*, *Einstein*, and *Satyagraha*—that Glass had betrayed his art. And so it is worth remembering, when considering Glass's decline, or lull, that artists have a way of surprising, and defeating, their critics. At least he is still working. He did not quit while he was ahead, or retire early like Rossini or Sibelius, or come to some abrupt rock and roll termination. And there are those powerful Piano Études—which Glass, no keyboard virtuoso, will play in April at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. They may still point a way toward a wise and self-aware maturity, less a sin of his old age than a harbinger of his future. ■

The return of cheap pessimism.

Inside the Limo

By ROBERT KAGAN

The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War by Robert D. Kaplan

(Random House, 198 pp., $21.95)

I.

ROBERT D. KAPLAN has made a career out of exposing the dark side of the post-Cold War world. A travel writer by profession, though one with considerably loftier ambitions, Kaplan has spent the last decade and more visiting the world's hellholes, cataloguing their miseries, and holding them up for discomforting perusal before what he regards as a pampered, self-satisfied Western elite naively clinging to the illusion of progress. This Western elite wanted to believe that the big story of 1989 was the fall of the Berlin Wall. Kaplan disagreed. "When the Berlin Wall was falling," he wrote in 1994, in an essay called "The Coming Anarchy," "I happened to be in Kosovo, covering a riot between Serbs and Albanians. The future was in Kosovo, I told myself that night, not in Berlin." Years later, when Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat shook hands on the White House lawn, Kaplan was on a flight to Bamako, Mali, a place of "corrugated-zinc shacks at the edge of an expanding desert." Again, the same feeling struck him: "The real news wasn't at the White House, I realized. It was right below."

One may detect a certain egoism in Kaplan's recurrent claim that "the real news" is being made wherever Kaplan happens to be. But it is more than that. Kaplan's thesis is that the true character of the modern world is to be found not in the wealthy postindustrial West, but in the miserable regions of unfolding anarchy that Kaplan has chosen to visit and

ROBERT KAGAN is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to write about, in Sierra Leone and the other disaster areas of West Africa, in the sprawling shantytowns of Egypt and Turkey, in Pakistan and Cambodia, and in the war-ravaged Balkans.

By far the most important essay reprinted in his new book is the title essay, in which Kaplan first and most boldly sketched out his dire prophesies for the future. When "The Coming Anarchy" appeared in *The Atlantic Monthly*, it brought Kaplan renown as the world's premier pessimistic paradigmist. Along with Samuel P. Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations," which had appeared in *Foreign Affairs* a few months earlier, Kaplan's essay was acclaimed as the answer to Francis Fukuyama's own sensational article in *The National Interest* a few years earlier, proclaiming "The End of History." Kaplan's article, like Huntington's, struck a chord among those who were troubled by Fukuyama's liberal determinism, or who were disillusioned at the depressingly illiberal direction in which some parts of the world had moved in the years since the end of the Cold War, or who were simply unhappy, as intellectuals would be, about Fukuyama's notion that the grand ideological debate was over and there was nothing more to be discussed.

A SCANT THREE years after the end of the Cold War, much of the intellectual world was already sick of optimism. Kaplan produced the cure. In "The Coming Anarchy," he wrote that "we are entering a bifurcated world." Some parts of the world were "inhabited by Hegel's and Fukuyama's Last Man, healthy, well fed, and pampered by technology." But the other, "larger, part is inhabited by Hobbes's First Man, condemned to a life that is 'poor, nasty, brutish, and short.'" (He meant "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.") To envision the future, Kaplan argued, quoting from an article by a political scientist named Thomas Fraser Homer-Dixon, one had to imagine "a stretch limo in the potholed streets of New York City, where homeless beggars live." Inside the limo "are the airconditioned postindustrial regions of North America, Europe, the emerging Pacific Rim, and a few other isolated places, with their trade summitry and computer-information highways." Outside the limo "is the rest of mankind, going in a completely different direction." Outside the limo, Kaplan predicted, "would be a rundown, crowded planet of skinhead Cossacks and *juju* warriors, influenced by the worst refuse of Western pop culture and ancient tribal hatreds, and battling over scraps of overused earth in guerrilla conflicts that ripple across continents and intersect in no discernible pattern."

This was certainly a striking image of the future. Bill Clinton found Kaplan's article "stunning," remarking that it "makes you really imagine a future that's like one of those Mel Gibson 'Road Warrior' movies." Reading "The Coming Anarchy" today, one is struck by the prophetic accuracy of Kaplan's description of the beggars' world, or at least his description of West Africa, the region on which he reported most extensively. Kaplan's theme was "the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war." He was right. A recent, lengthy *New York Times* article documenting the massive war that now involves Congo and the nine nations surrounding it reads like a drier version of Kaplan's essay of seven years ago.

Disintegrating or nonexistent central governments, tribal warriors armed with a postmodern mix of machetes and helicopter gunships, hundreds of thousands of migrants both escaping war and searching for food in an ever-more-depleted environment, an African interior becoming as inaccessible and "dark" as in the Victorian era, war rippling across the African continent and intersecting in no discernible pattern: this was Kaplan's prophecy in 1993, and it seems a fair description of much of African reality in 2000. Well might Kaplan gibe, in the preface to his new book, that "the optimistic future many predicted for a democratizing sub-Saharan Africa in the wake of the Cold War was no less naïve than the Wilsonianism of a previous era."

It was probably Kaplan's portrait of a "bifurcated" world that most readers found interesting, persuasive, and even predictive. His split picture of the post-Cold War world was a significant notion in the early 1990s, and it was soon adopted as something of a new orthodoxy. It became the core of debates, still fervent, over whether "globalization" was a universal phenomenon or a parochial one, and over whether the effects of globalization might increase rather than decrease the gap between the developed and the developing worlds. As the focus of the world's attention flipped back and forth in the 1990s between the glories of the "new economy" and the entrenchment of liberal democracies in Europe and Asia, on the one hand, and the ruinous wars, humanitarian disasters, and disintegrating societies of Somalia, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Congo, and the Balkans, on the other, it was easy to imagine a future in which life inside the limo got better and better while life among the beggars got worse and worse.

IMPERIAL CHINA
900–1800

F. W. MOTE

In this history of China for the 900-year time span of the late imperial period, senior scholar F.W. Mote highlights the personal characteristics of the rulers and dynasties and probes the cultural theme of Chinese adaptations to recurrent alien rule. No other work provides a similar synthesis: generational events, personalities, and the spirit of the age combine to yield a comprehensive history of the civilization, not isolated but shaped by its relation to outsiders.

5 halftones, 22 maps, 9 charts, 1440 pages
new in cloth



HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
www.hup.harvard.edu • phone: 800 448 2242

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II.

ODDLY ENOUGH, HOWEVER, this was not the point that Kaplan wanted to make in "The Coming Anarchy." His real argument was far more ambitious, and far more disturbing for the West. Kaplan's point was that the bifurcation was only temporary; that it was, in fact, an illusion. The limo was not secure. In time, he insisted, and probably in a relatively short time, life inside the limo would come to resemble life outside the limo. The "coming anarchy" would not be confined to Kaplan's disaster areas but would become global. "West Africa's future," Kaplan insisted, "will also be that of most of the rest of the world."

This was a daring leap, and it was probably what made "The Coming Anarchy" a sensation rather than a merely useful account of the dark side of the world after the Cold War. Kaplan wrote about West Africa and other maelstroms of human misery not because he wanted to show us how the other half lived, but because he believed that the truths he discovered in these places had universal application. He believed that the West was doomed to suffer the same fate. West Africa, he insisted, was "a natural point of departure for my report on what the political character of our planet is likely to be in the twenty-first century." Kaplan had visited Abidjan and seen *our* future.

Everywhere he traveled in West Africa, he saw the West's destiny. In Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast, for example, Kaplan discerned that the biggest problem confronting people was not coups, rebellions, or "episodic experiment[s] in democracy," it was crime. The governments simply lost control after dark to "hordes" of lawless young men. And this, Kaplan insisted, was America's future, too. In Abidjan, "restaurants have stick- and gun-wielding guards who walk you the fifteen feet or so between your car and the entrance." This "giv[es] you an eerie taste of what American cities might be like in the future."

Crime and war were becoming indistinguishable in the nations of West Africa. It followed from this that they would become indistinguishable everywhere in the world, including the United States. "As crime continues to grow in *our* cities and the ability of state governments and criminal-justice systems to protect their citizens diminishes, urban crime" would develop into a kind of low-intensity conflict among racial, political, and religious factions. As "small-scale violence multiplies at home and abroad, state armies will continue to shrink, being gradually replaced by a booming private security business, as in West Africa."

The environmental crises in Africa and other parts of the Third World were also signs of what was to come in the First and Second Worlds. Again, Kaplan believed that he had been vouchsafed prophetic knowledge about the West "while driving from the airport to downtown Conakry, the capital of Guinea." What he saw was a "nightmarish Dickensian spectacle": "The corrugated metal shacks and scabrous walls were coated with black slime.... The streets were one long puddle of floating garbage. Mosquitoes and flies were everywhere. Children, many of whom had protruding bellies, seemed as numerous as ants." This African environmental disintegration, Kaplan insisted, was "as relevant to the future character of world politics as the Balkans were a hundred years ago," which, if one followed the analogy, meant that Africa could provide the spark for the next cataclysmic world war. And the environmental disasters that Kaplan chronicled in Africa and other parts of the Third World were just part of the "terrifying array of problems that will define a new threat to *our* security."

In Africa, and elsewhere on his worldwide tour of horrors, Kaplan witnessed crumbling states, shantytowns and shanty cities sprawling across borders, ethnic migration patterns making a mockery of internationally recognized borders. From these observations, he deduced that the same fate was in store for all nations. The chaos that he witnessed in Africa was the beginning of a global phenomenon, and we were on the eve of "an epoch of themeless juxtapositions, in which the classificatory grid of nation-states is going to be replaced by a jagged-glass pattern of city-states, shanty-states, nebulous and anarchic regionalisms."

The United States was certainly not immune from the creeping breakdown and doom. "Indeed, it is not clear that the United States will survive the next century in exactly its present form. Because America is a multiethnic society, the nation-state has always been more fragile here than it is in more homogeneous societies like Germany and Japan." Connecting the dots further, Kaplan even suggested that the disintegration in West Africa could be the catalyst for America's disintegration. "The spectacle of several West African nations collapsing at once could reinforce the worst racial stereotypes here at home.... Africa's distress will exert a destabilizing influence on the United States."

III.

KAPLAN'S ATTEMPT TO turn West Africa into a window on the entire world's future was, of course, labored. The security policies of restaurants in the Ivory Coast do not reveal much about the level of crime in America's future. And as for Africa acting as a catalyst for American racial polarization: the truth is that every government in Africa could collapse and it would not have a sliver of the impact of the slaying of a single African immigrant by New York City policemen.

Kaplan's excesses, again, could be chalked up to egoism, albeit of truly impressive proportions. Not only was "the real news" wherever Kaplan happened to be standing; so, too, was the key to discovering all of mankind's destiny. But that would be to slight Kaplan's broader argument, which was that the liberal West was itself heading toward upheaval and transformation. In all likelihood, Kaplan did not find this revolution while traveling in Africa. One strongly suspects that he simply found evidence in Africa for what he already believed was the West's impending doom.

The idea that there was something rotten at the core of the West was only a vague sub-theme of "The Coming Anarchy," in part because the essay itself was written in a rather anarchic style, and in part, one suspects, because Kaplan had only just begun to wrestle with the big questions that he was trying to address. Most of the time, he seemed to be suggesting that the threat to the West came from without—from *juju* warriors too postmodern to be fought by conventional means, from diseases and environmental hazards that wafted across from the uncivilized to the civilized world, or from a barbarism whose love of violence "those of us inside the stretch limo, concerned with issues like middle-class entitlements and the future of interactive cable television, lack the stomach to contemplate." At other times, however, it was clear that Kaplan believed that the limo world was itself plagued with inherent, self-destructive tendencies; that its image of itself as a bastion of liberalism and progress was inaccurate; that its faith in its own governing principles was misplaced; and that it, too, was destined for anarchy, or perhaps a new form of tyranny, with or without the *juju* men.

In throwaway lines and asides, Kaplan evinced an angry disdain for his own world and its beloved principles. The contented bourgeoisie of the West was distinguished, in his view, chiefly by its blissful ignorance both of the real world that surrounded it—the world Kaplan traveled in—and of its own miserable future. These "children of suburbia and city streets" were "blind" to the "reality" of the natural world. Their journalists and policymakers just couldn't fathom the "incredible security implications" of environmental change. They could not see

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

how "surging populations, environmental degradation, and ethnic conflict" were "deeply related." They did not understand "what a risky idea the nation-state is." The West's picture of the world was simplistic and utopian: everyone seemed to think that lines on maps offered an accurate picture of humanity. It infuriated Kaplan that travel publications, "themselves by-products of an age of elite touring which colonialism made possible," still reported on and photographed the world "according to country."

The bourgeoisie of the West also did not realize that their vaunted universal principles were irrelevant, at best, to "the coming anarchy," and that "the argument over democracy" in many parts of the world was entirely beside the point. And they did not understand that even their own democracies were disintegrating. The United States, Kaplan insisted in "The Coming Anarchy," was in the midst of a "slow but unmistakable process of transformation," evidenced by "racial polarity, educational dysfunction, social fragmentation of many and various kinds." But its citizens, lusting after interactive cable television, did not seem aware that their nation was falling apart. Above all, the peoples of the West, fat and happy in their post-Cold War, consumption-driven, liberal delirium, simply refused to see that "something far more terrible awaits us."

KAPLAN'S CHAOTIC ESSAY was a jeremiad aimed at the West, and as with all jeremiads, it counted among the greatest of the sinners' sins their willful ignorance of the imminence of God's wrath and, perhaps even more damning, their refusal to heed the prophet's warning. What distinguished this from the traditional jeremiad, however, was that it was unclear what the sinners needed to do to reform their ways. The traditional jeremiad offered a solution, a way of appeasing God and avoiding his just punishment. It aimed to convince men to reform their souls, to live more pious lives, to seek humility, to renounce worldly goods and worldly ambitions, to do God's bidding. Although in his sketchy indictment of the West, Kaplan cited the usual list of sins—crass materialism, hypocrisy, ignorance, arrogance, hubris about mankind's mastery over the natural world and God's universe—he did not exhort the sinners to go and sin no more. His implicit message was that reform was impossible. Rot and decline were inherent and inevitable.

If the theme of a rotting, liberal West was only adumbrated in "The Coming Anarchy," later essays, included in this volume, give a fuller explication of Kaplan's thinking and his purposes. In "Was Democracy Just a Moment?," which was published two years ago, Kaplan set out to expose as silly and delusory modern liberalism's abiding faith in democracy. Kaplan does not only deny the inevitability and the applicability of democratic governance in many parts of the Third World—a skepticism which many others share. He does not only argue, as others have also argued, that democracy can be a positively disastrous form of government for many poor and underdeveloped societies, which would be better off under tyranny. Kaplan takes the argument against democracy a couple of significant steps farther, and in the process heads off into philosophical explorations far stranger and, to the Western liberal mind, more shocking than anything he encountered in Africa.

MOST WESTERN THEORISTS who believe that poor and underdeveloped countries would be better-served by autocratic rather than democratic forms of government do not deny that liberal democracy is the most desirable form of government. Their only point, which is certainly debatable, is that for many countries a period of autocracy may be a necessary stage in the evolution toward democracy. They believe that stability must precede liberty. They do not believe that stability should preclude liberty. What they fear is "illiberal democracy"; but they fear it not least because it will, in Fareed Zakaria's words, "discredit liberal democracy itself, casting a shadow on democratic governance."

Kaplan repeats many of the standard arguments against trying to impose democratic government on allegedly unready peoples. (His essay on democracy came out at exactly the same time that Zakaria's essay on "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy" appeared in *Foreign Affairs*.) But he goes a good deal further than most, in blaming democracy for the horrendous evils of the twentieth century: "Hitler and Mussolini each came to power through democracy"; "In Bosnia democracy legitimized the worst war crimes in Europe since the Nazi era"; in Rwanda, "the parliamentary system the West promoted was a factor in the murder of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis," and so forth.

And on one point Kaplan abandons the pack entirely. He insists that for many countries, and perhaps for all countries, and perhaps even as a matter of abstract theory, liberal democracy should not be considered the pinnacle of political development. That exalted position, Kaplan suggests, may belong to authoritarianism. Kaplan calls himself a "tragic realist," and like many modern realists, he professes

Azure

New Issue

Ideas for the Jewish Nation

no. 9
spring 5760 / 2000

Did Herzl Want a "Jewish" State?
Yoram Hazony

The 'USS Liberty': Case Closed
Michael B. Oren

Towards a Hebrew Literature
Assaf Inbari

Plus: Yehoshua Porath on Tom Segev and the New History

Azure goes beyond the headlines to provide thought-provoking analysis of cultural and intellectual trends in the Jewish state and the Diaspora

To order, call 1-877-298-7300 or E-mail shalemorder@shalem.org.il

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

great admiration for Hobbes. More than most, however, or at least more than most would admit, he shares Hobbes's seventeenth-century preference for "enlightened despotism" over democracy.

The only leaders and governments that Kaplan praises are despots. For every example that he offers of the horrors allegedly brought about by a democracy, he provides an example of the good done by what he variously labels the world's "neo-authoritarian" or "hybrid" regimes. He praises one African leader as "an enlightened Hobbesian despot whose country has posted impressive annual economic growth rates." He praises Fujimori's Peru "where, all the faults of the present regime notwithstanding, a measure of stability has been achieved by a retreat from democracy into quasi-authoritarianism." And, of course, there is every realist's hero, Lee Kuan Yew. "The current reality in Singapore," Kaplan writes, "shreds our democratic certainties." Lee Kuan Yew's "offensive neo-authoritarianism, in which the state has evolved into a corporation that is paternalistic, meritocratic, and decidedly undemocratic, has forged prosperity out of poverty."

Though he despises Western materialism and the bourgeoisie's endless search for personal comfort and security, Kaplan judges governments entirely on the basis of whether they can deliver the material goods and provide that security. He is impressed by economic growth rates in China, and argues that democracy would be a disaster for China. "Had the student demonstrations in 1989 in Tiananmen Square led to democracy," Kaplan asks, "would the astoundingly high economic growth rates of the 1990s still obtain?"

THE MORAL ARGUMENTS for democracy Kaplan dismisses as poppycock. "The very fact that we retreat to moral arguments ... to justify democracy indicates that for many parts of the world the historical and social arguments supporting democracy are just not there." Nowhere in Kaplan's essay can one find even a hint that people might value individual rights and liberty as much as they value goods and security. For Kaplan, the only measures of government success are material. And since he judges governments strictly by their economic efficiency and their ability to provide stability, it is not surprising that he finds democracies to be "value-neutral."

Kaplan certainly finds no particular reason for bias in favor of democracy. At most, he is indifferent as to whether societies are governed democratically or tyrannically. "Political systems in 2100 will be elegantly varied," Kaplan mused in an end-of-the-millennium article in *The New York Times*, "unconstrained by the sanctimony of the late twentieth century, with its simple call for 'democracy.'" Yet on the whole Kaplan makes it pretty clear that he would prefer to see less democracy in the world and more authoritarianism. "Though the swing toward democracy following the Cold War was a triumph for liberal philosophy," Kaplan declares, "the pendulum will come to rest where it belongs," somewhere between the idealistic aspirations of modern liberalism "and the realities of Hobbes." As Kaplan sees it, "the 'triumph' of democracy in the developing world will cause great upheavals before many places settle into more practical—and, it is to be hoped, benign—hybrid regimes."

What is this "hybrid" regime? At times, Kaplan suggests that it is a government that is "neither democratic nor authoritarian but a cross between the two." Others, too, have spoken of this wondrous, mythical beast, with the head of an angel and the body of a wolf: they call it "liberal autocracy." But Kaplan can only take the joke so far, and eventually he acknowledges that there is no such thing. His "hybrid" regime is, in truth, a tyranny, in which a facade of democracy makes more palatable the reality of authoritarianism. (The Somozas in Nicaragua were, presumably, a "hybrid" regime.) They "call themselves democracies," Kaplan writes, "and we may go along with the lie," but the "hybrid" regimes are "decisively autocratic."

These "hybrid" regimes, Kaplan predicts, will multiply in the coming years, because changing circumstances will require them. The forces of economic and financial globalization will create a demand for "efficient neo-authoritarian governments" that can satisfy the international corporate world's desire for stability and predictability. "Authoritarian or hybrid regimes, no matter how illiberal, will still be treated as legitimate if they can provide security for their subjects and spark economic growth." And since Kaplan dismisses as irrelevant the moral arguments for democracy, and therefore, by extension, the moral arguments against tyranny, he offers no reason why these regimes should not be treated as legitimate.

IV.

THE PROBLEM WITH most realists is that they prescribe for other peoples forms of government that they themselves would never tolerate. (Fareed Zakaria has observed, perhaps reasonably enough, that one would rather live in authoritarian Malaysia than in democratic Ghana. It is an easy judgment to make when one lives in New York.) Kaplan does not fall into this trap. He does not confine his predictions or his prescriptions to the non-Western world. Indeed, it is in the very heart of the modern liberal West, in the United States itself, that Kaplan sees democracy withering away in favor of a new, "high-tech" feudalism.

"We are entering a troubling transition," Kaplan believes, "and the irony is that while we preach our version of democracy abroad, it slips away from us at home." Modern Americans, in Kaplan's view, are no more concerned with their individual rights and liberties than the peoples of Sierra Leone or Singapore. In his essay on democracy, Kaplan recounts approvingly what an "urban-affairs expert" named Dennis Judd told him: "It's nonsense to think that Americans are individualists. Deep down we are a nation of herd animals: micelike conformists who will lay at our doorstep many of our rights if someone tells us that we won't have to worry about crime and our property values are secure."

In Kaplan's view, Americans have become slaves to their material possessions and their personal security, and as a result no longer care about their communities, much less their political system. They have "opt[ed] out of the ... 'social contract' for the sake of a protected setting." They have become docile and indifferent. "[T]he last thing America needs is more voters," Kaplan argues, "particularly badly educated and alienated ones." Yet nevertheless, he observes, "when voter turnout decreases to around 50 percent at the same time that the middle class is spending astounding sums in gambling casinos and state lotteries, joining private health clubs, and using large amounts of stimulants and anti-depressants, one can legitimately be concerned about the state of American society."

The "willingness to give up self and responsibility is the sine qua non for tyranny," in Kaplan's view; and everywhere Kaplan looks he finds evidence that Americans are ready for a tyranny much like that of the late Roman empire. He sees it at basketball games, which he likens to the gladiator sports of a decadent Rome. "Many of us don't play sports but love watching great athletes with great physical attributes.... Basketball in particular—so fluid, and with the players in revealing shorts and tank tops—provides the artificial excitement that mass existence 'against instinct,' as the philosopher Bertrand Russell labeled our lives, requires." And Kaplan makes a special point of the fact that big-time basketball players are predominantly black, noting that "gladiators in Rome were almost always of racial or ethnic groups different from the Romans."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Who will command this nation of "escapists and voyeurs," this nation of sheep? Kaplan's answer is, the corporations. Over the coming century, he predicts, corporations will emerge as America's new rulers, and they will do so with a deft combination of force and their ability to somnambulize a population already made docile by its love of material possessions. American citizens will happily submit themselves to corporate authority, since they have always "put up with restrictions inside a corporation" which they would "never put up with in the public sphere." Their appliances alone will make them willing slaves to corporate power. "The more appliances that middle-class existence requires," Kaplan argues, "the more influence their producers have over the texture of our lives."

But can corporations "rule" merely through their products, without the coercive power of the state? As Kaplan sees it, the corporations are already busily arming themselves. They are hiring "private security firms" to police their "enclaves." They are building malls, with *their* "own rules and security forces." And because they are "anchored neither to nations nor to communities," the increasingly well-armed corporations are becoming less and less loyal to the state.

THESE TWO TRENDS—the increasing docility of the population and the increasing independence and military strength of the corporations—will be mutually reinforcing. The "mood of the Coliseum goes together with the age of the corporation." The corporations will offer the populace the entertainment it craves, while they assume the role once held by the nation-state. The rise of corporate power will occur "more readily as the masses become more indifferent and the elite less accountable."

Already, Kaplan argues, American cities are "re-emerging as Singapores, with corporate enclaves that are dedicated to global business and defended by private security firms adjacent to heavily zoned suburbs." In time, the entire country will devolve into corporate-run city-states. It will become "a more peaceful and productive version of chaotic, warring city-state Greece." Is it not conceivable, Kaplan asks, that the corporations will "project power to the advantage of the well-off while satisfying the twenty-first-century servile populace with the equivalent of bread and circuses?" (It is, of course, not conceivable. But, then, Kaplan sees emerging tyranny in shopping malls.)

In Kaplan's future, democracy will exist, at best, in name only. "An elite with little loyalty to the state and a mass society fond of gladiator entertainments form a society in which corporate Leviathans rule and democracy is hollow." Elections will be irrelevant: "How we vote during the next hundred years may be a minor detail for historians." Indeed, "the category of politics we live with" will depend more on the power relationships among corporate city-states "than on whether we continue to hold elections." As Kaplan implies, Americans will perhaps do away with elections altogether.

And well they might. Their so-called democracy will be a farce; perhaps it already is. "Just as Cambodia was never really democratic," Kaplan writes, "despite what the State Department and the U.N. told us, in the future we may not be democratic, despite what the government and media increasingly dominated by corporations tell us." Democracy is already an obvious fraud in many poor countries. "Africans want a better life and instead have been given the right to vote," and Kaplan hopes that they will be delivered from this fate into the hands of the "hybrid" regimes. Why should not the same fate await the United States? "[A] new politics might emerge for us, too—less like the kind envisioned by progressive reformers and more like the pragmatic hybrid regimes that are bringing prosperity to developing countries."

Again, the changed circumstances of the twenty-first century will demand it. "Precisely because the technological future in North America will provide so much market and individual freedom, this productive anarchy will *require* the supervision of tyrannies—or else there will be no justice for anyone." (Henry Kissinger will no doubt be pleased that Kaplan cites his book *A World Restored* in support of this view.) "A hybrid regime may await us all," Kaplan concludes. "The future of the Third World may finally be our own." And so we have come full circle. Africa's present really is the world's future.

KAPLAN GIVES LITTLE indication that he views this prospect with alarm. Although he writes disparagingly of the transformation of American society, nowhere does he make clear that the turn to a "hybrid" regime in the United States is something to be dreaded or in any way opposed. Quite the contrary. Kaplan would have us believe that something along the lines of his "hybrid" regime is not far from what the American Founding Fathers originally had in mind.

According to Kaplan, James Madison long ago anticipated the future that Kaplan describes. "His vision of a future United States was that of a vast geographic space with governance but without patriotism, in which the state would

A spyglass in the great naval tradition...

Adm. Nelson's Telescope™ (with table tripod) just $59.95*

**But read this ad for an even better deal!*

When Horatio Nelson fought the battle of Trafalgar, he used a telescope just like this to monitor the movements of the French-Spanish fleet. Our manufacturer has created a faithful replica of this famous scope. *Admiral Nelson's Telescope™* measures about five inches in its "collapsed" position. When you extend the four sections to full length, the scope will be thirteen inches long and focused to infinity with needle sharpness. Everything will appear twenty-five times larger than it would to the naked eye. Compare that to standard binoculars which give you only 6x or 8x magnification.

The most amazing thing about *Admiral Nelson's Telescope™* may well be its price. We are the exclusive importers of this outstanding optical instrument and are able therefore to bring it to you for just $59.95. **But we have an even better deal: *Buy two for $119.90 and we'll send you a third one, with our compliments—absolutely FREE!*** If you have ever wanted to own a fine telescope, but found prices a little steep, *Admiral Nelson's Telescope™* should be your choice. You'll get many years of good use and enjoyment from it.

• *The optics of* Admiral Nelson's Telescope™ *are "25x30" which means 25x magnification and the great light-gathering capacity of a 30mm objective lens. Admiral Nelson's telescope was made of brass. This replica is heavily chrome-plated for extra beauty and protection. The scope comes with a belt-looped vinyl carrying case. For permanent mounting the scope comes with an extendible table-tripod.*

FOR FASTEST SERVICE, ORDER TOLL FREE (800) 797-7367 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. OR FAX YOUR ORDER TO: (415) 643-2818

For customer service, please call (415) 643-2810.

Please give order #1069F534 for *Admiral Nelson's Telescope™*. Give Visa/MC number and expiration date and daytime phone # for all orders. Add $4.95 for one, $9.90 for three for ship./ins. (plus sales tax for California delivery). You have 30-day refund and one-year warranty. We do not refund shipping charges.

Admiral Nelson's Telescope™ is the outstanding corporate gift of the year. We can apply your logo in quantities of 100 or more. Call Chris Simpson at (415) 643-2810 for more information!

since 1967 **haverhills®**

2360 Third St., San Francisco, CA 94107

© Order by toll-free phone: (800) 797-7367 or (fastest!) by fax: (415) 643-2818 ©
Visit our website at www.haverhills.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be a mere 'umpire,' refereeing among competing interests." Or, as Kaplan would have it, among competing, corporate feudal city-states. For 200 years, Kaplan suggests, Madison's "concept" of the "umpire" regime went untested. But now that we are heading toward governance by an oligarchy of militarized corporations, "Madison's concept is relevant anew." The Founders, Kaplan seems to believe, drew their "philosophical sustenance" from that aspect of Hobbes's philosophy "which placed security ahead of liberty in a system of enlightened despotism." The American future, he imagines, may fulfill this original vision.

Kaplan's rendition of the Founding is, to say the least, unique. If it was an enlightened despotism that the Founders wanted, how did they manage to establish a democratic republic? In fact, the Founders would have recoiled from Kaplan's vision of corporate feudal city-states and undemocratic "hybrid" regimes. Madison's design in the Constitution was the very opposite of what Kaplan suggests. Rather than creating a weak central government to act as a "mere umpire" among strong and independent regional or factional powers, Madison aimed to create a supreme national authority in the federal government. He argued that a federal elected body would be less susceptible to factional pressures than local state bodies, and that elected officials at the national level would therefore have a better chance of deciding issues according to an elevated conception of the national, common good. The federal government would not be a "mere" umpire; in Madison's vision it would be the supreme and all-powerful arbiter of the national interest. This was how Madison hoped to restore overall virtue to republican government without counting on the individual virtue of the citizens.

More troubling than Kaplan's simple misreading of Madison, in fact, is that he drains from the Founding all such elements of morality and virtue. The Founders, Kaplan would have us believe, were "tragic realists" just like him. They, too, considered democracy pretty much "value-neutral." "Certainly," Kaplan acknowledges, "moral arguments" in support of democracy were "aired" at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 (one recalls that a moral argument or two may also have been aired in the Declaration of Independence); but Kaplan seems to believe the Founders' primary goal was "overall stability." He is wrong. Yes, the Founders were interested in stability, but their primary concern was protecting the rights and freedoms they considered "natural" and given by God. Kaplan's discussion of the Founders is an embarrassing mess, but it is also a revealing mess. By invoking the Founders, Kaplan leaves the reader little choice but to assume that he himself believes that the neo-authoritarian, "hybrid" government he envisions for America's future is something to be welcomed.

V.

At the beginning of his essay, Kaplan compares democracy to Christianity, and he does not mean this as a compliment. "In the fourth century A.D.," Kaplan remarks, "Christianity's conquest of Europe and the Mediterranean world gave rise to the belief that a peaceful era in world politics was at hand, now that a consensus had formed around an ideology that stressed the sanctity of the individual." Instead of fulfilling this promise, however, Christianity "kept evolving, into rites, sects, and 'heresies' that were in turn influenced by the geography and cultures of the places where it took root." Meanwhile the Church itself "became a ritualistic and hierarchical organization guilty of long periods of violence and bigotry." Christianity did not make the world more moral or more peaceful. In fact, it had the opposite effect. "Democracy, which is now overtaking the world as Christianity once did, may do the same."

Readers may detect the high anti-clerical voice of Edward Gibbon in Kaplan's account of Christianity. And, sure enough, among the essays reprinted in this volume is a brief encomium to Gibbon and his great work. Kaplan expresses admiration for Gibbon's historical iconoclasm, especially his "merciless" smashing of the icons of Christianity, which Gibbon depicted as a cult of superstition that had conquered and for centuries suppressed the rationalism of the ancient world. It was Gibbon's willingness to challenge the received wisdom about the Church's role in history that Kaplan most admires. Gibbon's work was a supreme act of "literary bravery," for in his day, as Kaplan rather clumsily explains, "the Church was a sacred cow." *Philosophes* such as David Hume praised him, but defenders of the Christian faith wrote dozens of books denouncing his heretical rendition of history. "Bad reviews" forced Gibbon to write a "vindication" of his work, and "he did it brilliantly"; but attempts "to undermine the *Decline and Fall* continued."

The reader does not get far into this essay before realizing that Kaplan is writing about himself. He fancies himself a Gibbon for our time, a fearless exposer of truth in a world dominated by myth. Today's myths, of course, are secular, not religious. Today's "church" is modern liberalism, made confident and arrogant by its recent victory over communism. Its catechism is an exhortation to democratic government and free-market capitalism; its creed is human progress; its episcopacy is the elected leadership of the world's democracies, and the intellectuals, the journalists, and the academics who propagate its doctrines. And Kaplan is the self-appointed smasher of these modern, secular icons (or, as he prefers in his subtitle, a shatterer of dreams), who dares to expose to light the cracks and the crevices of democracy, who sneers at liberal idealism, and who reveals, by analysis of the facts, both the farce and the tragedy of any optimistic belief in human progress that may have come with the West's triumph over Soviet communism. The liberal victors in that struggle "naturally assume[d]" that they had accomplished something of "deep significance," Kaplan writes in his preface. They were wrong.

Kaplan does not expect everyone to be happy with his conclusions. The "realism exhibited" in his work, the "unrelenting record of uncomfortable truths," may appear "radical to those in the literary, journalistic, and academic communities," but then no more so than Gibbon's attack on Christianity offended the sensibilities of those same communities in his day. One hesitates, of course, to pursue Kaplan's self-congratulatory comparison of himself with Gibbon. But perhaps a few of the contrasts are worth drawing out, if only as a way of casting Kaplan's work in the appropriate light.

One obvious distinction is that Gibbon was a historian. His account of Roman and Christian history may have been tendentious, but it was unquestionably learned, a serious work of scholarship, built on a careful compilation of the historical record. Kaplan's grip on history is weak. Just about every historical event or political philosopher he discusses he gets at least half-wrong. His mangling of the American Founding is but one example. There are others. Kaplan has trouble grasping Tocqueville's theory of "democratic despotism"; he seems to believe that Tocqueville warned of democracy giving way to despotism, although Tocqueville, like the Founders, was actually concerned about an entirely democratic "tyranny of the majority." Kaplan also believes that the "era of organized nation-states" began in 1648, after the Peace of Westphalia. In what sense were Henry VIII's England and Francis I's France not organized nation-states? And so on.

In general, Kaplan's style of analysis is the reverse of historical scholarship. It consists of leaping from a limited number of observations to wild speculations of the broadest conceivable nature. He

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

You deserve a factual look at...

Much Pressure on Israel

Will Barak be able to preserve his country's security?

Unrelenting pressure is being applied on Prime Minister Ehud Barak to make ever-more-dangerous concessions to the Palestinians. What we have seen so far is only a foretaste of what is going to be demanded from Israel in the so-called "final status negotiations." What follows are some areas in which demands will be made and pressure will be applied.

What are the facts?

Land for Peace. The whole concept is absurd. Never in the history of the world has any nation returned lands to those who have attacked it. Even so, in line with the Camp David accord, Israel has yielded the vast Sinai to Egypt. It has yielded Gaza and about 40% of the "West Bank" to the Palestinians. Over 90% of the Arab population of the territories is under the control of the Palestinian Authority. What else is expected of a country that occupies only a fraction of 1% of the lands occupied by the Arabs? And shouldn't land for peace work both ways? Shouldn't the Arabs give up some land to get peace? Or why not just simply "peace for peace"?

> "By not yielding to pressure and by not allowing Israel to be strategically weakened, Mr. Barak will bring peace with security, *shalom batuach,* to Israel and to the entire Middle East."

A Palestinian State. Israel could not survive if Judea/Samaria (the "West Bank") were in unfriendly hands. And, especially in light of the experience since the "handshake," during which time more Israelis were killed by Palestinian terrorists than in any comparable previous period, there can be little question of the enduring hostility of the Arabs. The "West Bank" mountain ridges dominate the narrow waist of Israel, in which over 70% of the Jewish population, 80% of its industrial base, and the most important military installations are located. The Palestinians would not need an army to make life in Israel impossible. Moveable Katyusha rockets would dominate the area. Israel needs to keep strategic control of the "West Bank," without which it would not be defensible.

Return of the "Refugees". Population transfers have occurred throughout history. In 1923, Greece and Turkey agreed to a resettlement of 2 million Greeks and 800,000 Turks; in 1945, the resettlement of 3 million Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia was arranged. Following the collapse of its North African empire, France accepted close to 1.5 million people. More than 12 million(!) Muslims and Hindus were exchanged between India and Pakistan. Israel has recognized this historical necessity. But the "Arab Nation", with its enormous wealth and vast underpopulated lands, has stubbornly refused to face facts. Instead of allowing the Palestinians who left Israel in 1948 (and their descendants) to be integrated into their societies, they have, for the past fifty years, kept them in miserable "refugee camps" and have encouraged them to plot vengeance and terrorism. Return of these people to Israel, including Judea/Samaria (the "West Bank") is impossible. Neither Israel nor any Palestinian entity could absorb them. There is not enough land and not enough water. It would be as unthinkable as for those 3 million Germans to return to Poland and the Czech republic or, for that matter, for the 800,000 Jews who fled or were expelled from the Arab countries to return to their original homes.

Jerusalem. Before the end of the 1967 Six-Day War, no claims to Jerusalem being a Moslem holy city or the capital of any Arab country were asserted. But for over two thousand years, Jews have been living in Jerusalem and they have been the majority population since the 19th century. Why should they give up their capital, their holy city as far back as memory goes—or even any part of it? The Moslems have their holy cities, Mecca and Medina, and they have 22 Arab capitals. There are important Arab cities in the "West Bank", under full control of the Palestinian Authority. But Jerusalem is the eternal and indivisible capital of the Jewish State.

These are the most important issues that Ehud Barak and his government will have to confront in the final status talks. As to Jewish "settlements" in the "West Bank": Netanyahu has made clear that Jews have the right to live in any part of the land of Israel, all of the land west of the Jordan River. And why not? How is it possible that 160,000 Jews living among 1 million Arabs in the "West Bank" should be an obstacle to peace if over 1 million Arabs live within the "green line" of Israel? They don't have to fear for their lives and nobody considers them an obstacle to peace. By standing firm and resolute, by not yielding to pressure from any source, domestic or foreign, and by not allowing Israel to be strategically weakened, Mr. Barak will have earned the trust of Isreal and the world and will bring peace with security, *shalom batuach,* to Israel and to the entire Middle East.

This ad has been published and paid for by

FLAME

Facts and Logic about the Middle East
P.O. Box 590359 ■ San Francisco,CA 94159

FLAME is a tax-exempt, non-profit educational 501(c)(3) organization. Its purpose is the research and publication of the facts regarding developments in the Middle East and exposing false propaganda that might harm the interests of the United States and its allies in that area of the world.Your tax-deductible contributions are welcome. They enable us to pursue these goals and to publish these messages in national newspapers and magazines. We have virtually no overhead. Almost all of our revenue pays for our educational work, for these clarifying messages, and for related direct mail.

Yes, I want to help the publication of these ads and in clarifying the situation in the Middle East. I include my tax-deductible contribution in the amount of

$_____ /62A

❑ My contribution is in the amount of $100 or more. Please send me your videotape on three important aspects of Israel's strategic situation, fiery speeches by Yasser Arafat, and some memorable moments with Louis Farrakhan.

My name is_____

I live at _____

In_____ State ____ Zip_____

Mail to : FLAME, P.O. Box 590359, San Francisco, CA 94159

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

admires Gibbon's "sweeping" generalizations, his "elliptical elegance," which overcome by their brilliance his "factual inadequacies." This may have been true of Gibbon; it is not true of Kaplan. He is a futurologist, and not a particularly rigorous one. Bill Clinton was right to see Mad Max in "The Coming Anarchy": Kaplan's speculations are generally the kind of dystopian fantasies that one finds in Hollywood's futuristic extravaganzas.

NOR CAN KAPLAN quite claim the same degree of "literary bravery" that he admires in Gibbon. As it happens, modern liberalism, unlike the eighteenth-century Church and Crown, is simply delighted to have its faith questioned and its orthodoxies challenged. Indeed, the extent to which liberalism welcomes and even demands that its "sacred cows" be set up for slaughter by people like Kaplan, employing the rationalist scrutiny that Gibbon and his fellow enlightenment thinkers helped unleash, is at once both its greatest strength and its greatest vulnerability. The sensation that can be created by Paul Kennedy predicting the West's decline, or by Samuel Huntington predicting an apocalyptic clash of civilizations that the West might lose, or by Kaplan predicting global anarchy, resurgent authoritarianism, and the overwhelming of the West by "*juju* warriors," is testament to the fact that the Enlightenment's modern heirs love their heretics perhaps even more than they love their apostles.

Kaplan laments that the post-Cold War years have been "lonely times for realists" such as himself. But the truth is that the realists dominate our foreign policy and intellectual establishments. And while Kaplan has received the occasional bad review, including in these pages, this image of a solitary and despised prophet does not really fit a man who also boasts that his articles have been "translated into over a dozen languages and reprinted constantly." His book is praised by the leading intellectuals of our time: Gibbon had Hume; Kaplan has Huntington. Kaplan and other professional pessimists have been making their lonely, iconoclastic pilgrimages straight to the bank. (Kaplan can even legitimately claim to have powerfully affected the thinking of high-ranking members of the Clinton administration, and even the president himself.)

Yet the most important difference between Kaplan's writing and the great work of his eighteenth-century hero concerns their respective purposes. Kaplan would have us believe that Gibbon, too, was a "tragic realist" like himself. Nothing could be further from the truth. Gibbon labored to sweep away the superstitions of Christianity so that the full flowering of reason could lead man to a better future. When he wrote about Rome's decline, it was not because he believed his own world was similarly in decline. Gibbon, unlike Kaplan, believed in human progress, and even in the irreversibility of human progress. In *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, he wrote that "We cannot determine to what height the human species may aspire in their advances toward perfection, but it may safely be presumed that no people, unless the face of nature is changed, will relapse into their original barbarism." Mankind could "acquiesce in the pleasing conclusion that every age of the world has increased, and still increases, the real wealth, the happiness, the knowledge, and perhaps the virtue of the human race."

Kaplan appears to believe that realists have a monopoly on the appreciation of tragedy, that believers in progress cannot acknowledge the enduring "reality of human evil." This is a self-serving and inaccurate conceit. Those who seek to improve the human condition may be as aware of the darker sides of life as any realist. Idealism is not a variety of innocence. The Founders were not tragic realists, they were tragic idealists. Indeed, tragic idealism may have been their particular contribution to the political imagination. They erected their institutions in the full awareness of human vice, and yet those institutions were intended to produce virtue.

Gibbon destroyed the Church in order to build a temple to reason. Why does Kaplan destroy? Even accepting his dubious equation of the historical roles of democracy and Christianity, what is his purpose? To pave the way for a future of tyranny? In part, no doubt, Kaplan wants to titillate and to disturb, *épater les bourgeois* and all that; but still he should be taken seriously. For Kaplan may be the only American writer alive with the nerve openly to promote the authoritarian ideal as the logical culmination of "realist" thinking.

OTHER PROMINENT AMERICAN intellectuals, and especially the realists, harbor Kaplan's deep cynicism about democracy, both abroad and at home; but they know how impolitic it would be to voice such views aloud. Kaplan alone is willing to spell out the realist view in all its ramifications, and to recognize that there is something about realism that runs directly counter to the fundamental principles of American society. He is prepared to follow the logic of realist amoralism wherever it leads him, even if it leads him to a "hybrid" regime in place of democracy in his own country. This confers upon his work a deeply unattractive usefulness. Kaplan's writings show what happens when you remove moral considerations entirely from historical analysis, when you reduce everything—international relations, domestic governance, politics—to the pragmatic and the material. He demonstrates the consequences of setting to one side considerations of natural or God-given rights and training your hard-boiled brain on whatever remains.

American realism has always confronted this paradox: if the United States is founded on universal principles, how can Americans practice amoral indifference when those principles are under siege around the world? And if they do profess indifference, how can they manage to avoid the implication that their principles are not, in fact, universal? And if these are not universal, natural, God-given rights that they stand for, then why need they adhere to them at home? If it is simply a matter of habit and circumstance, then, as Kaplan points out, circumstances and habits can change. Almost all realists simply blink away this difficulty. Kaplan does not. His amoralism is consistent.

THE FINAL IRONY is that Kaplan himself is probably not amoral. To spend one's adult life chronicling so much human misery is unusual behavior for a realist. Beneath the cold facade of hard-headed realism one can imagine in Kaplan a heart that aches for the poor souls about whom he writes. Sure, he views with cynicism and skepticism the flawed liberal attempts to fix the unfixable, the over-promising and the under-delivering, the high moral rhetoric of the West that is matched only by its ignorance of the problems. And some may question his authoritative prescription for Third World citizens, since for every Lee Kwan Yew there are a dozen Mobutus and a dozen more Duvaliers. But Kaplan's writings, especially "The Coming Anarchy," can also be read as a cry for help on behalf of the beggar world.

This would at least explain why Kaplan attempts the impossible, why he tries so hard to show that the fate of the liberal West is directly and intimately tied to the plight of West Africans. He knows that many in the West may be unperturbed at the prospect of a truly "bifurcated" world. After all, if more than a billion people in North America, Europe, and East Asia are destined to zoom off in their fat-cat limos, leaving the rest of the world behind, well, that is a pretty good chunk of humanity. Why, exactly, should they care if the rest of the world, in West Africa, Central Asia, and even parts of Latin America, sinks back into barbarism? Kaplan tries to force

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

them to care by insisting, implausibly, that the horrors that he witnesses in West Africa will soon be visited on the liberal West.

The real tragedy is that Kaplan's realism precludes him from making the only appeal that can plausibly be made to the inhabitants of the world's stretch limousine: the appeal of universal morality and common humanity. Why should we care what happens in West Africa? Kaplan tries to appeal to us on the pragmatic, material grounds of realism. If we do not pay attention, he warns, we will lose money, we will lose security, we will become sick with disease. Many realists believe that these arguments are not only legitimate, but also that they are the only arguments that are likely to persuade. They are wrong on both counts. The most powerful reason why Western liberals, why all Westerners, should care about West Africans is that they are human. And to the extent that we are indifferent to their suffering, to the extent that we would be complicit in denying them the natural, universal rights that we enjoy, we ourselves become less human. ■

Inside, Outside

By OMER BARTOV

Nazi Policy, Jewish Workers, German Killers by Christopher R. Browning

(Cambridge University Press, 174 pp., $49.95, $15.95 paperback)

RECENT SCHOLARSHIP ON the planning and the implementation of the genocide of the Jews by the Nazis has been exercised primarily by three themes: the decision-making process that culminated in state-organized mass murder (linked by some to Nazi policies of expulsion and resettlement geared to the creation of "living space" in the east); the relationship between Germany's massive recruitment of forced and slave labor and the simultaneous extermination of Jewish workers (in some cases associated with the Nazi regime's "hunger policies" of killing undesirable consumers of food); and the motivation of, especially, low-level perpetrators directly involved in the killing. Thanks to massive research in these areas, we now know far more about the realities of Nazi genocide than we did a mere decade ago. Still, it is unlikely that in the foreseeable future scholars will reach anything like a consensus on the reasons for studying the Holocaust, or on the proper methods for such research. Everyone agrees on the dark, almost incalculable significance of these events; but when you ask what is it about the Holocaust that makes it significant and therefore in urgent need of study, the answer turns out to depend largely on one's discipline, training, politics, national origin, and age.

The scholarship may be divided, for example, between the study of the perpetrators and the study of the victims. The former nominally adheres to conventional scholarly methods, and its controversies focus on such traditional questions as causes and effects, timing and location. Generally, this historiography is fastidiously detached from the horror, and its practitioners consider emotional involvement an obstacle to understanding. Indeed, the bulk of the research on the Nazi view of the "final solution" is written by historians who would find it inconceivable to share even a fraction of their protagonists' viewpoint.

Those who write on the victims, by contrast, must adopt unconventional methods. Instead of relying on "objective" documentation by official government agencies found in state archives, they rely largely on "subjective" accounts by victims, or on the memory of survivors. And they necessarily abandon the cool bureaucratic gaze that facilitated the work of the perpetrators and makes its reconstruction by historians an easier empirical task. These historians venture instead into the raging physical and mental pain of those who were subjected to such "administrative" measures. For the study of the experience of the horror, the traditional tools and the methodological conventions of the historian are often inappropriate.

It might thus be argued that what his-

OMER BARTOV's book *Mirrors of Destruction: War, Genocide, and Modern Identity* will be published by Oxford in May.

Don't miss... OCEAN OF WORDS
the first collection by HA JIN,
winner of the National Book Award



Hardcover 216pp $24.00

"A compelling collection, powerful and richly diverse."
The New York Times Book Review

More from Zoland Books
UNDER THE RED FLAG $13.00
IN THE POND $20.00

ZOLAND BOOKS
www.zolandbooks.com



Over 1,700 Titles
Available for Purchase or Rental by Mail
for a free catalogue, with $6 off coupon write or call:
Dept. NE • Box 969 • Ashland, OR 97520
1-800-729-2665
http://www.blackstoneaudio.com
BLACKSTONE AUDIOBOOKS
Unabridged Recordings of Great Books

Advertise with
The New Republic
Small Space Program.

Contact Shannel Myers at
(212) 924-8700 for reservations and information.

PUT YOUR MESSAGE
IN FRONT OF
100,000 CONSUMERS!

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

torians can explain best about the Holocaust are also its least crucial aspects—its periphery and not its core; that they can reconstruct the organization and the administration of genocide, but they cannot penetrate the manner in which it was lived and understood by its protagonists, the extremities of suffering, the pathology of torture, the breakdown of all moral barriers. But the situation is more complicated. The experience of atrocity is certainly as universal as the beast in man; but one may argue that what makes the Holocaust both unique and relevant is the thoroughly modern manner in which it was organized. From such a perspective, an enormity of this kind is not only a past event, but also a present danger. And the complications continue to multiply. It can also be said that because the most respected historical monographs on the Holocaust tend to focus on the perpetrators, they give the killers' view pride of place, and thereby perpetuate the dehumanization of the victims. Conversely, the growing volume of literature on the victims threatens to mythologize suffering, heroism, and victimhood; and to elevate experience over rational explanation; to manipulate emotions and to legitimate obfuscation.

It would appear that the only way out of these quandaries—if we do not wish to abandon the study of genocide altogether—is to seek a middle wisdom, a path between these historiographical extremes that would allow us to include both perspectives. It is only in this manner that we might be able to undo the dehumanization of the victims while at the same time recognizing the (terrifying, because so normal) humanity of the perpetrators. For the encounter of the one group with the other is the precise moment at which any understanding of genocide must begin, and where, ultimately, it must end.

CHRISTOPHER BROWNING HAS been writing for more than twenty years on the origins and the implementation of the "final solution." Beginning with a study of the German Foreign Office's involvement in the Holocaust, Browning went on to publish two collections of essays that examined such issues as the murder of the Jews of Serbia, the development and the production of gas vans, and Nazi resettlement and ghettoization policies in Poland. In the controversy between the "intentionalists," who argue that the Holocaust was a product of Hitler's long-term urge to murder the Jews, and the "functionalists," who assert that genocide began as a series of local initiatives geared to resolve the logistical impasse of impossibly crowded ghettos, Browning has taken what he calls a "moderate functionalist" position. He recognizes initiatives from "below," but he insists on crucial direction from "above." With the publication of *Ordinary Men* in 1992, Browning also entered the discussion over the motivation of the perpetrators that came to a head four years later in the controversy over Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners*.

Browning's new book covers the three main areas of research mentioned above, namely, decision making, labor policies, and perpetrator motivation. It is a slim volume, containing six essays that were initially presented as lectures at Cambridge University. The essays contain a greal deal of interesting material, some of it new, some of it a reinterpretation of known research, some of it a response to direct or indirect criticism by scholars who have published voluminous studies in this area in the last few years. By and large, one may conclude that Browning has not radically changed his positions on any of the major issues that have been at the focus of his research; but he has progressively modified his interpretations—in some respects not thoroughly enough—about the immediate causes and the exact dating of the decision on the "Final Solution," as well as the motivation of the killers on the ground.

In his new book, moreover, Browning ventures for the first time into the area of the experience of the victims and their testimonies. This is an important turning point in his scholarship, which brings him one lap closer to a more nuanced perception of the Holocaust. Yet it is here that he falters, and seems somewhat unsure as to how this material should be interpreted and what implications it may have for the understanding of the Holocaust in its entirety.

BROWNING'S "MODERATE FUNCtionalism" can best be summed up as a theory of "incremental genocide." In this regard, Browning is now part of a growing consensus among Holocaust scholars who have abandoned the polar positions of "intentionalism" and "functionalism" in favor of a more complex, better documented, and ultimately more accurate reconstruction of the shift from the Nazi regime's "Jewish policies" (*Judenpolitik*) to its "policies of extermination" (*Vernichtungspolitik*). Still, there remains a great range of interpretation even within this general assertion of "incremental genocide." Thus Peter Longerich has recently argued that the shift toward policies of extermination began as early as the invasion of Poland in September 1939, but that it culminated in a policy of "indiscriminate murder of all Jews at the end of the deportation" only as late as May 1942. According to Longerich, there was no moment of decision; there was instead a long process over several years. Conversely, Christian Gerlach has recently suggested that Hitler made a clear decision on the murder of Europe's entire Jewish population in early December 1941, following the Soviet counteroffensive at the gates of Moscow and the Japanese attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor. Those events, in Gerlach's view, convinced Hitler that Germany was finally engaged in the kind of world war that, as he had "prophesied" in January 1939, would lead to the extermination of the Jews.

Browning is not alone in his assertion that a decision on the continent-wide genocide of the Jews was reached some time in the fall of 1941, probably in October, after Hitler had already ordered the mass murder of Soviet Jews two months earlier. Yet in view of recent scholarship, Browning now concedes that "this does not mean that some specific plan was approved or that clear-cut and comprehensive orders were given at this point," since, in fact, "no such plan yet existed." Rather, this was merely the moment "at which Hitler, Himmler, and Heydrich—and a widening circle of intimates thereafter—were aware that the ultimate goal or vision of Nazi Jewish policy was now the systematic destruction and no longer the decimation and expulsion of all European Jews." This sounds remarkably similar to the argument made by Longerich that even at the end of 1941 "there was still no general authorization for the murder of central European Jews" and no "program or plan for systematic destruction," but rather that a "climate for the development of such a program or plan" had been created.

The paucity of information on the decision-making process of the Nazis compels scholars to make inferences from both veiled and often ambiguous statements by perpetrators made at the time and in later testimonies, and from the actual unfolding of events on the ground. On one point, however, Browning seems now to be somewhat isolated from his colleagues, and may well need to revise his position further in view of his own earlier modifications. According to Browning, the October decision on the "final solution" came in the wake of a "euphoria of victory," when Hitler felt that the Soviet Union was about to collapse and that therefore the time was ripe to eradicate the Jews. Most scholars believe now that Hitler's decision was in fact motivated by the fear that the war might well not end up in victory, and the consequent realization that the plans for "living space" in the east would not be realized, which led

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the growing urge to "at least" accomplish the single most important "historical" task of Nazism, the mass murder of the Jews.

This latter interpretation fits not only with a good deal of direct and indirect historical evidence, but also with the apocalyptic mood of Nazism, and the ever-accelerating nihilistic urge that it manifested in view of its own looming destruction. Hitler's best-documented euphoric moment was his little "dance" upon hearing of France's request for armistice in June 1940; but euphoria was not Hitler's normal temper. He was in his element, rather, at times of extremity, violence, and hopelessness. That is why he felt relieved to be able finally to attack the Soviet Union. And that is why he seems to have looked forward to the time when the Jews would "make it possible" to realize his "prophesy" of extermination by "unleashing" a world war against the Reich. What drove Hitler and his movement forward was the anticipation of doom. Even in his last testament the *Führer* urged his followers to continue the struggle against Judaism, on the assumption that the murder of six million Jews had still not sufficed to save Germany from its most lethal enemy.

IN MORE GENERAL terms, it is crucial to note the curious dynamics of Nazi extermination policies and their subsequent scholarly interpretations. To be sure, genocide was an incremental affair. But given the increasingly adverse military and economic conditions, the minimal investment of manpower and logistical resources, and, not least, the inefficiency and the chaos that are said to have characterized the Nazi system, how could this unprecedented operation be carried out with such extraordinary success? Hans Mommsen has described the Third Reich as a "polycratic" system and the Holocaust as the consequence of a process of "cumulative radicalization." Yet no regime in history has ever managed to kill so many people, over such a vast territory, in so short a time and with such meager resources. The disproportion between the crime and the energy employed to commit it, the efficiency of execution and the disorderly system that produced it, is one of the most baffling aspects of the Holocaust.

As Browning and other scholars have shown, Nazi Germany was both highly centralized, in that decisions from the top could radically change realities on the ground, and highly decentralized, in that as long as such decisions were not handed down, officials were given a great deal of room for initiative. This regime was quite skillful at choosing those initiatives on the ground that appeared best suited to implementing and systematizing its policies. In this sense, the system worked very much like a modern industrial corporation. General tasks were announced, and different agencies or officials tried in a variety of ways to interpret and to accomplish them. These who performed best were promoted and given greater powers of control and organization. Those who failed were ignored or dismissed. The apparent chaos created remarkable efficiency and "productivity," and the relentless competition brought out the "best" in the operators of the machine. The difference was that the main product of this machine were corpses.

THE INDUSTRY OF death was the defining feature of the Nazi regime. But even this kind of production, especially at a time of total war against superior enemies, calls for a tremendous amount of material and industrial output. Hence one of the great dilemmas of the regime was how to employ its real and imaginary captive enemies in the production of war material and at the same time to kill them with equal efficiency. Which came first, the destruction of the racial enemy under the Nazis' control, or the destruction of the military enemy ranged against them? The regime made some compromises in view of the growing labor shortage and (barely) kept alive those Soviet prisoners of war who survived initial maltreatment, starvation, and political and racial selection (3.3 million of a total 5.7 million Soviet prisoners of war died in Gerrnan hands), as well as Soviet citizens forcibly recruited for work in German factories and farms. But as far as the Jews were concerned, with very few and extraordinarily fortunate exceptions, the Nazis insisted that the ideological goal of total extermination superseded even the most urgent economic need.

In his new book and in his earlier essays, Browning has demonstrated that between 1939 and 1941 local Nazi officials in occupied Poland chose to exploit the labor of ghettoized Jews rather than to let them starve. This served the needs of the war economy, enriched the SS, and enabled the Jews to buy meager rations of food, thereby preventing the outbreak of epidemics that threatened also the "Aryan" sectors of Polish cities. But once orders were given from above that even the most productive ghettos must be eliminated, officials on the ground began sending their inhabitants to the newly constructed death camps in vast numbers. Browning's account thus undermines the "functionalist" theories according to which the process of destruction

"The focus of this fine book, which is at once doggedly scrupulous and quietly passionate, is the slave market that operated in New Orleans in the years before the Civil War."
—Jonathan Yardley, WASHINGTON POST BOOK WORLD

"Johnson provides the fullest, most penetrating examination of the antebellum slave market to date... An essential book for anyone who wants to understand why slavery matters."
—Randall M. Miller, LIBRARY JOURNAL

"*Soul by Soul* brilliantly bares the base meaning of chattel bondage and by extension antebellum Southern society by inspecting the mechanism that produced and reproduced slavery in the nineteenth-century United States and in the process defined slave, slave trader, and slaveholder."
—IRA BERLIN

Soul by Soul

Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market

WALTER JOHNSON

2000 Avery O. Craven Award and Co-winner, 2000 Frederick Jackson Turner Award of the Organization of American Historians



Soul by Soul tells the story of slavery in antebellum America by moving away from the cotton plantations and into the slave market itself. Taking us inside the New Orleans slave market, the largest in the nation, where 100,000 men, women, and children were packaged, priced, and sold, Walter Johnson transforms the statistics of this chilling trade into the human drama of traders, buyers, and slaves. What emerges is not only the brutal economics of trading but the surprising interdependencies among the actors involved.

20 halftones • $26.00 cloth

Harvard University Press
800 448 2242
www.hup.harvard.edu

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was unleashed by initiatives from below.

Now Browning adds a study of several labor camps built by the Nazis following the destruction of the ghettos and the murder of the bulk of Poland's Jewish population. He again shows that ultimately the genocidal urge of the regime would not allow the survival of even those small and highly productive enclaves of Jewish workers. They, too, ended up being sent to extermination camps, despite the recognition by some officials on the ground that such policies were detrimental to the local economy and the general war effort. This case study powerfully undermines the notion of any rational plan behind Nazi economic policies in Poland, as proposed some years ago by the German scholars Götz Aly and Susanne Heim. Ideological determinants *always* won out. The compromises that were temporarily allowed by the leaders of the regime, and adopted more or less eagerly on the ground, were invariably given up in favor of killing.

Then

What came through the fields was a white horse
galloping toward us:
a white horse with red eyes,
snarls of black flies
swirling about it. What came
through the fields had blood on its mane
and blood on its forelocks—and blood
splattered its loins. We stood
watching it come. We said prayers
that it might swerve. We put our hands to our ears
to block out its whinnying.
We did everything
but run. A coven of sparrows rose
from the grass and settled again. Across
the fields lay the broken swath
of weeds its slashing hooves left
bowed in their wake. No god
to protect us! No road
of words we might take—the white horse
galloping across the fields toward us.

Dick Allen

In order to provide readers with a "thick description" of these labor camps, Browning has used a variety of testimonies given by their survivors. These are fascinating accounts, some related or written immediately after the liberation, others produced many years later by survivors living in different countries and continents. They provide a vivid picture of life in labor camps about which we still know very little, despite recent studies by Felicja Karay (herself a survivor), Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, and some young German scholars. Browning shows that even in such camps there was a Jewish elite, which was often characterized by greed, corruption, nepotism, violence, and all the other unsavory features of collaboration with the Nazis under the brutalizing conditions of slave labor and the imminence of death.

While this chapter adds a new dimension to Browning's work, he is far more cautious about drawing any conclusions from the evidence than in other sections of the book. Indeed, one is not quite sure what the purpose of this essay within the context of the book as a whole is, since it does not tell us more about the dynamics of Nazi decision making, or about the relationship between slave labor and genocide, than we already know from the German documentation. To be sure, the material that Browning has tapped could be used to investigate the various—and in most cases the futile—attempts of survival by the Jews, and the manner in which the Germans exploited their prisoners' desperate desire to live and turned it to their own advantage. But this chapter is curiously lacking in the kind of analytical acuity that characterizes Browning's writing on the perpetrators, demonstrating perhaps the difficulties involved in switching perspectives.

Browning has obviously recognized the need to use such sources in order to provide a thicker and more nuanced picture of the reality of the Holocaust on the local level, but he seems to be still somewhat unsure about how to analyze this material and to employ it most profitably. This is especially difficult considering the terrible moral dilemmas imposed on the victims by the Nazis, and the consequent reluctance of the historian to judge, or even to expose, all the sordid and pitiful details at his or her disposal. So Browning must be praised for venturing into this particular darkness; but he has yet to develop a more comprehensive and critical view of the victims as well as the perpetrators.

For now, in any case, Browning seems to feel more at ease analyzing the group dynamics and the motivation of the killers than reconstructing the endless suffering and the brutal choices imposed on the victims. This is a subject on which he has already written *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland*; and in many ways his essays on this question in his new book serve both as a response to his critics and as a further elaboration and revision of his interpretation in that important and influential book.

The question of perpetrator motivation was at the center of the recent debate between Browning and Goldhagen, not least because it has much wider implications both for our understanding of the Holocaust and for our understanding of human evil.

From his study of the German Reserve Police Battalion 101, Browning concluded that the relatively older men of this unit who took part in mass killings of Jews were primarily motivated by peer pressure, and not by ideological conviction or a fear of punishment. This conclusion was rejected by Goldhagen, who argued that the men of Battalion 101 and similar units were motivated first and foremost by a vehement "exterminationist" anti-Semitism that originated long before Hitler's regime and was expressed in their urge not only to kill but to torture Jews, and in the pleasure and the pride that they took in their actions. Interestingly, what both historians tended to ignore was the importance of Nazi ideological indoctrination by the regime and its role in motivating the perpetrators to acts that we would view as pure murder.

Browning's current contribution to this debate is very welcome precisely because, on the basis of several other cases that he has meanwhile examined at close range, he arrives at the conclusion that a minority—but a significant and influential minority—was indeed motivated by an ideologically internalized hatred of Jews. Browning does not go very far in these essays in inquiring where these men had internalized such ideas. Did they acquire them from their training in the police or the army, or did they acquire them prior to their recruitment, by exposure to the educational system and the culture of their country? Browning does not say; but he shows clearly that environmental factors may well have played a major role, in that policemen serving in areas familiar to them tended to be less brutal toward Jews than those who came from elsewhere, just as we know that policemen were at least initially less brutal toward German than Polish Jews. He also shows that such men went through a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gradual process of brutalization, and that those who had inhibitions at the beginning rapidly lost them in the course of subjecting others to violence.

None of this is especially surprising. My own studies of German soldiers' involvement in the implementation of Nazi policies in the East revealed the same kind of progressive brutalization. Some soldiers were more deeply indoctrinated than others, and behaved from the very beginning very cruelly, especially toward populations and enemy soldiers whom they deemed culturally and physically different. Russians, and even more so Gypsies and Jews, were often targeted for murder from the very beginning of the campaign in the Soviet Union.

But the brutality of the war, and the orders from above that facilitated and often urged this kind of conduct, made the murders all the more widespread. This is neither to deny the impact of anti-Semitism, which was of course a major component of Nazi ideology and indoctrination, nor the impact of peer group pressure, which operates whenever human beings work in groups, especially in harsh circumstances. Still, there was a link between the tremendous efforts by the regime and its agencies to indoctrinate their agents ideologically, and the uniquely destructive energies that these agents unleashed on the ground; and this link must be emphasized. It appears that Browning, too, has now accepted the importance of this factor.

More generally, the question remains as to the overall relationship not only between ideology and motivation, but also between the Nazi "worldview" and the policies of the regime. In the last few years, a tremendous amount of progress has been made in research on the local manifestations of Nazi policies against both the Jews and other groups such as the handicapped, the Gypsies, and the Russians. Such local studies greatly help in reconstructing the whole. At the same time, they may also divert attention from the common characteristics of Nazism. In the vast bloody puzzle that was the Third Reich and its European empire, and given all the local differences, incremental progress, and elements of coincidence and circumstances, what was it that drove a modern, bureaucratic, sophisticated, and industrialized nation in the heart of Europe to perpetrate such destruction on its environment and ultimately on itself?

Some elements of the answer to this question can be found in Browning's current book, and in many of his previous writings. But in order to confront it more directly—indeed, in order to pose it in a coherent and comprehensive manner—we need to shift our gaze from the parts to the whole, and from the perpetrators to the culture from which they came, a culture to which their first victims also belonged. That the greatest horror of this century emerged from one of the most admired cultures of Europe is to this day more than a puzzle; it is a trauma of civilization, and it casts its shadow all the way to our own time. ■

CORRESPONDENCE

continued from page 5

responsible for dependents the option of providing care themselves (with appropriate compensation) or availing themselves of the services of others, will American women truly enjoy the right to shape their own lives.

SONYA MICHEL
Director
Women's Studies Program
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

ELISABETH LASCH-QUINN REPLIES:
I stand by my review in full. Sonya Michel's letter reveals the same kind of thinking I analyzed at length there: dismissal of all serious reservations about day care as "condemnation" rooted in a desire to deny women equality and self-fulfillment; cynicism about the potential for equal and mutually edifying partnerships between men and women conducive to the flourishing of children (the idea that any such affectionate relationship could result from women's "demand" that men shoulder domestic burdens, or angry commands of any kind, strikes me as absurd); and unpopular insistence on huge government outlays as solutions to social problems—in this case universal, government-funded day care. Instead, I proposed a mixture of family responsibility, restructuring of the workplace, and redistribution of wealth within the corporate pay structure. The race and class implications of just one of the particular proposals I favor—full benefits for part-time work—are pretty clear; they undoubtedly help explain why the AFL-CIO is currently pushing for such a measure. Such restructuring would immediately benefit all families, including those with only one parent. Dramatically increased flexibility would allow—and, where needed, encourage—parents to devote as much of their time as possible to the love and care their children deserve. ■

THE NEW REPUBLIC

WE WOULD LIKE YOUR HELP!

If there is a newsstand or bookstore in your neighborhood that does not sell **THE NEW REPUBLIC** and you think it should, please let us know.

Either call us at **202.331.7494** (ext. 3402) or send an e-mail message with the name and address of the newsstand or bookstore, along with your name, to circulation@tnr.com

For customer service problems or inquiries, please call our toll-free number:
1.800.827.1289

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOSTON DIARIST

Going Negative

AFTER ANOTHER CRUSHing loss in which his struggling team was booed by its hometown fans, Rick Pitino, coach of the Boston Celtics, issued a sputtering declaration that caused quite a stir locally: "All the negativity that's in this town sucks." The reaction to Pitino's outburst was hostile. But that just proved his point. In fact, the coach was right. Despite a fabulous economic boom and plummeting crime rates, there's been a lot of negativity around here lately.

TAKE, FOR STARTERS, THE LATEST excesses of the Big Dig. By January, the massive highway project, originally priced at $2.6 billion, had already ballooned to nearly $11 billion. Then, last month, state officials said the price tag would grow higher still—to $12.2 billion. And their behavior upon releasing the figures was, well, negative. The state's transportation czar called one of the governor's top aides "a reptile," labeled another "a moron," and threatened to punch a reporter. The state auditor, not to be outdone, likened the transportation czar to Saddam Hussein.

THE BIG DIG DEBACLE WAS JUST THE latest bad news for Republican Governor Paul Cellucci, who over the past year has suffered a series of embarrassments and burlesque scandals that have pounded his public-approval ratings into the floor. They began last summer with a Boston Harbor "booze cruise" involving a top state official, his lobbyist pals, and several young women, including an actress named Gidget who impulsively bared her breasts to a photographer who (unbeknownst to her) worked for the *Boston Herald*. A few months later, the governor accused the state Senate president of "extortion" after, Cellucci claimed, the senator privately threatened to kill a bill to raise the governor's salary unless Cellucci vetoed a new campaign finance law. The two men even threatened to take lie-detector tests to clear up their competing versions of events, until the senator pointed out that "it seems demeaning as hell." Then, in March, Cellucci watched John McCain clobber George W. Bush—whose candidacy he had spent months conspicuously promoting—in the Massachusetts Republican primary by a 65-to-32 margin. It was McCain's biggest win of the campaign, and it dampened talk of Cellucci's "exit strategy" into a Bush administration. Now the Big Dig has created for Cellucci an extremely inconvenient contrast: the cost overrun is nearly as large as an income tax cut he hoped to pass this year.

BUT CELLUCCI'S MISFORTUNE, GREAT as it is, cannot possibly compete with that of one Jack E. Robinson, a wealthy black businessman whom the state GOP presented as its challenger to Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy this November. Bad choice. Since his name surfaced two weeks ago as the likely GOP nominee, Robinson, in rapid succession, has had to declare that he is "not a groper" of women, explain that he failed the bar exam three times because he "didn't really study," deny ever owning Chinese throwing stars, and downplay the fact that he has lived out of state for the past 13 years. Hours after formally announcing his candidacy last week, in a perfect metaphor, Robinson found himself in a three-car accident, which occurred while he was conducting a live radio interview via cell phone. (Listeners were treated to the sounds of squealing tires and slamming metal.) Topping things off, a witness accused Robinson of trying to flee the scene of the accident—an unfortunate leveler in a race against Kennedy. Thus, while Robinson had initially suggested he would base his campaign on Kennedy's character, he now appears to be looking for a new strategy.

WHEN CELLUCCI TRIED TO DISTANCE himself from his party's beleaguered Senate candidate, Robinson struck back, positing a conspiracy theory according to which Cellucci sold Robinson out to curry favor with Kennedy, who, in turn, will help Cellucci with his Big Dig crisis. Cellucci's "intention," Robinson howls on his campaign's website, "was to offer me up as a sacrificial lamb to his Big Dig banker." Now Robinson is retaliating by pondering aloud the taboo question of recent Massachusetts politics: how Cellucci accumulated $700,000 in debt during the 1990s and whether the governor's long-rumored (but never substantiated) gambling habit had anything to do with it.

AND, EVEN IF ALL THIS FADES, Boston will still be left with the perpetual negativity that stems from its endless inferiority complex, which depends largely on the assumed superiority of New York City. It is a topic of constant discussion here, particularly among young people who complain that the tradition-bound city discourages adventurous social lives and shuts down its bars too early. The point was memorably underscored when *The Boston Globe* ran a long series chronicling a twenty-something woman's search for happiness and love in the city. Her quest proceeded with painful futility for thousands of words until the series's final installment, in which she found the man of her dreams—in Manhattan, to which she promptly relocated. Even beloved former governor and ultimate Boston Brahmin William Weld unceremoniously packed up in January and headed to New York, leaving Boston more insecure than ever.

IT SHOULDN'T BE. IN MATERIAL IF not emotional terms, Boston is in wonderful shape these days. Its once-rancid harbor has been cleaned up, its streets are amazingly safe and clean, and people are paying outrageous rents to live within its limits. Yet there is a certain degree of self-loathing built into the city's psyche that cannot be cured by any amount of dot-com wealth or physical improvement. No, only one thing can solve Boston's self-esteem problem once and for all: a Red Sox World Series title. The team has not seen one since 1918 and is widely believed to be cursed by its ancient decision to sell Babe Ruth to the Yankees (a New York team, naturally). The haplessness of the Red Sox has come to represent Boston's ingrained sense that it is not a "world-class" town. So *Sports Illustrated* provoked more than a little interest this month when it ran a cover story headlined "WHY THE RED SOX WILL WIN THE WORLD SERIES."

YOU'D THINK THIS WOULD BE GOOD news, but the prediction has set off a minor panic. In part, the panic is due to superstitions about the fabled "*SI* jinx," under which an unfortunate fate befalls anyone who appears on the magazine's cover. But there may be more to it than that. On some level, Boston seems afraid of success. It relishes being the underdog; it dreads winning the World Series, literally or figuratively. People would lose their bearings—and their right to feel sorry for themselves. The city's dark secret is that most people in Boston don't think "all the negativity that's in this town sucks." Just the opposite—they thrive on it.

MICHAEL CROWLEY

MICHAEL CROWLEY is a reporter at *The Boston Globe*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SHAKESPEARE THEATRE
Michael Kahn
Artistic Director
450 7th Street, NW
Washington, DC
TTY: 202.638.3863
www.shakespearedc.org

"One of the world's three great Shakespearean theatres." *The Economist*

"The nation's foremost Shakespeare company." *The Wall Street Journal*

"As raw and powerful as theatre gets." Trey Graham, *USA Today*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Calvin Klein

underwear

cotton stretch



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED